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Abstract 
 
The recent resurgence of interest in the ‘other side’ of New Zealand’s colonial 
history has reaffirmed the need to view the nation’s history in its Pacific context. 
This historiographical turn has involved taking seriously the fact that as well as 
being a colony of Britain, New Zealand was an empire-state and metropole in its 
own right, possessing a tropical, Oceanic empire. What has yet to have been 
attempted however is a history of the ‘other side’ of the imperial debate. Thus far 
the historiography has been weighted towards New Zealand’s imperial and 
colonial agents. By mapping metropolitan critiques of New Zealand’s imperialism 
and colonialism in the Pacific (1883-1948), this thesis seeks to rebalance the 
historiographical ledger. This research adds to our understanding of New 
Zealand’s involvement in the colonial Pacific by demonstrating that anticolonial 
struggles were not only confined to the colonies, they were also fought on the 
metropolitan front by colonial critics at once sympathetic to the claims of the 
colonised populations, and scathing of their own Government’s colonial policy. 
These critics were, by virtue of their status as white, metropolitan citizens, 
afforded greater rights and freedoms than indigenous colonial subjects, and so 
were able to challenge colonial policy in the public domain. At the same time this 
thesis demonstrates how colonial criticism reflected national anxieties. The 
grounds for criticism generally depended on the wider social context. In the 
nineteenth-century in particular, critiques often contained concerns that New 
Zealand’s Pacific imperialism would disrupt the sanctity of ‘White New Zealand’, 
however as the twentieth-century wore on criticism bore the imprint of anti-
racism and increasingly supported indigenous claims for self-government. By 
examining a seventy year period of change, this thesis shows that at every stage of 
the ‘imperial process’, New Zealand’s imperialism in the Pacific was a subject 
open to persistent public debate. 
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Introduction 
One of the key questions regarding the  
colonial period is how to write about it.
1
 
The colonial Pacific has been written about extensively. The nature of Pacific 
Islands historiography has swung from ‘fusty, hidebound, backward-looking’ 
imperial history to J. W. Davidson’s ‘islands oriented’ approach first inaugurated 
in the 1950s.
2
 In the years since, various scholars have transcended the ‘Canberra 
school’ by adopting and/or exploring an ‘Islander point of view’ imbedded in 
indigenous epistemologies, while others have persisted with the colonial archive, 
albeit read ‘against the grain’.3 Brij V. Lal and Doug Munro have used a maritime 
metaphor to describe the myriad approaches: ‘there are other ships of state, under 
different navigators, following different stars, flying their distinctive flags, and 
each plying its own trade.’4 This research project has drawn inspiration from ‘new 
imperial history’ and its focus on the themes of race and racism, place and space, 
gender, class, and violence in the imperial cultures of the colonial periphery and 
metropolitan centre.
5
 By examining domestic opposition to ‘New Zealand’s 
Pacific’ between 1883 and 1948, this thesis presents a new perspective on the way 
the colonial Pacific is understood. Its focus on those men and women who 
contested the imperial order from the vantage point of the metropole demonstrates 
the contestability of the imperial order and the complexity of the imperial 
experience.    
                                                 
1
 Robert Borofsky in conversation with Gyan Prakash, ‘A View From Afar (South Asia)’, in 
Robert Borofsky (ed.), Remembrance of Pacific Pasts: an invitation to remake history (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000), p.296. 
2
 Stephen Howe, ‘Introduction: new imperial histories’, in Stephen Howe (ed.), The New Imperial 
Histories Reader (London & New York: Routledge, 2010), p.10; J. W. Davidson, The Study of 
Pacific History: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at Canberra on 25 November, 1954 (Canberra: 
The Australian National University, 1955).  
3
 Nicholas Thomas, ‘Partial Texts: representation, colonialism, and agency in Pacific history’, The 
Journal of Pacific History (JPH), Vol. 25, no. 2, 1990, p.153. Robert Nicole is one of several 
Pacific historians to read the archive against the grain, see Robert Nicole, Disturbing History: 
resistance in early colonial Fiji (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011), p.6.   
4
 Brij V. Lal & Doug Munro, ‘The Text in Its Context: an introduction’, in Doug Munro and Brij 
V. Lal (eds.), Texts and Contexts: reflections in Pacific Islands historiography (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘I Press, 2006), p.3. 
5
 See Howe, ‘Introduction’, pp.1-20. 
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The genesis of this project lies in an attempt at disentangling H. E. (‘Harry’) 
Holland’s so-called ‘Samoan Complex’.6 Convinced that the New Zealand Labour 
leader was the only significant metropolitan voice opposed to the colonial policy 
of the New Zealand Government, I studied his ‘complex’ with the intention of 
recovering his role in the Samoan struggle for self-determination. I had hoped to 
portray the politician as someone who stood out in a society where citizens were 
largely ambivalent towards ‘their’ colonial Pacific. However, the historical record 
shows that Holland was not exactly the anomalous figure I had originally 
imagined. There were a range of metropolitan figures and organisations—
religious, political and otherwise—who also questioned New Zealand’s particular 
brand of sub-imperialism. The realisation initiated a new project of its own. My 
scope had widened and the search for critics of ‘New Zealand’s Pacific’ had 
begun. Yes, Holland was perhaps the most noticeable critic; his position of 
political prominence enabled this, but what about voices from the other, perhaps 
less prominent, quarters of society? As it was, there existed an abundance of 
colonial criticism that, in my mind, could not remain unexamined. This thesis is 
the result of my task to unearth and find meaning in it all.   
The types of people that emerged from the archive and existing literature can be 
broadly classified into two categories. The first, and most prominent, category 
constituted the political, intellectual and creative Left. These were people like the 
poet-cum-activist R. A. K Mason, novelist Roderick Finlayson, and feminist-
campaigner Miriam Soljak. In addition to individual critics, there were left-wing 
organisations such as the New Zealand Communist Party (CPNZ) and the unions 
affiliated to them, as well as the Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom (WILPF). The second category, albeit more conditional than the Left, 
were Christian humanitarians. In the absence of a uniform policy from New 
Zealand’s major denominational Churches, several individuals made leading 
stands. The Methodist minister Arthur Liversedge, a man who ‘always seemed to 
have the mark of Christ on his brow’,7 was one such individual, and the Anglican 
Vicar, the Reverend Arthur John Greenwood, was another. The assertions of these 
individual clergymen were often complemented by non-denominational Christian 
                                                 
6
 See Nicholas Hoare, ‘Harry Holland’s ‘Samoan Complex’’, JPH, Vol. 49, no. 2, 2014, pp.151-
169.  
7
 Ormond Burton, Arthur Liversedge: a biography (Auckland: Forward Books, 1951), p.8.  
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organisations, of which ‘the splendid women’ of the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WCTU) were the most prominent.
8
 There were others too 
who did not fit these categories quite so neatly; here I refer to people like legal 
advisors to the Samoan Mau T. B. Slipper and P. B. Fitzherbert, and some Māori 
figures such as Te Puea Herangi, and to a degree, the politicians Sir Apirana 
Ngata and Sir Maui Pomare.  
Although my thesis maps different expressions of dissent over a period of 
roughly seventy years—from the height of ‘new imperial’ jingoism to the 
beginning of the ‘trusteeship’ era—it is not an exhaustive account of the period 
that covers all sides of the anti-imperial coin. I have focused on illustrative and 
representative cases that reveal key themes residing within New Zealand’s sub-
imperial debates at different stages of the imperial process. My study begins in 
1883, when the first major legislative step towards Pacific expansion was passed 
in New Zealand’s Parliament, and it ends in 1948 when imperialism, as formerly 
understood, had lost most of its lustre, and colonial binaries had been eclipsed by 
a more cooperative and conciliatory approach from both sides of the imperial 
divide.
9
 The cumulative effect is a portrait of colonial New Zealand that stands in 
contrast to the popular perception that ‘New Zealanders dreamed of their country 
as the future “Britain of the South,” destined to dominate the Pacific as the old 
country ruled the Atlantic.’10 Historians have generally avoided making hard-and-
fast claims about the pervasiveness of sub-imperial feeling, however the tendency 
to frame the narrative of ‘New Zealand’s Pacific’ around the imperial ambitions 
of leading political figures has given rise to the impression that New Zealand’s 
‘Pacific Destiny’ was something of an axiomatic truth.11   
This thesis argues that even though colonial critics were always a minority, 
criticism was more present than previous scholarship has acknowledged. 
                                                 
8
 Arthur Liversedge, ‘Letter to the Editor’, NZ Methodist Times, 28 Aug. 1920, p.13. 
9
 Stephen Howe has written that by ‘the 1950s if not earlier, such real faith as there had ever been 
in an imperial mission had been almost wholly lost.’ Stephen Howe, Anticolonialism in British 
Politics: the Left and the end of Empire, 1918-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.326. 
10
 Bernard K. Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1960), p.2. Also see Angus Ross, New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in the Nineteenth 
Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964). 
11
 ‘Pacific Destiny’ is Damon Salesa’s term, see Damon Salesa, ‘A Pacific Destiny: New 
Zealand’s overseas Empire, 1840-1945’, in Sean Mallon, Kolokesa Māhina-Tuai and Damon 
Salesa (eds.), Tangata O Le Moana: New Zealand and the people of the Pacific (Wellington: Te 
Papa Press, 2012), pp.98-99. 
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Commencing my study by unearthing the strains of uncertainty present during the 
late nineteenth-century—a period regarded as the high-point of New Zealand’s 
sub-imperial zeal—I show that even at the apex, criticism was prevalent, ideas 
were contested, and equivocation was far from unusual. And although twentieth-
century criticism of New Zealand’s colonial administrations is recognised more 
readily in the historiography, the true extent of this dissent has not been accounted 
for either. It is no coincidence that all the critics listed above can be traced to the 
interwar era. If the late nineteenth-century marked the height of support for New 
Zealand’s ‘Pacific Destiny’, the interwar period arguably represented the low 
point. During the 1920s, controversy surrounding New Zealand’s Samoan 
Mandate brought Pacific questions to the forefront of the nation’s conscience; 
opinion was divided, and the volume and forcefulness of criticism caused 
considerable unease amongst Government and colonial officials.       
As well as arguing that criticism of New Zealand’s imperial ambitions and 
colonial rule in the Pacific was an important feature of the nation’s colonial 
discourse, I have also explored the links between domestic dissenters and 
anticolonial nationalists residing either in the colonies or, as was often the case, in 
New Zealand; a cross cultural collaboration that Leela Gandhi has described a 
‘politics of friendship’.12  Like Gandhi, I show that even though one of the central 
features of colonial rule was the carefully managed maintenance of social and 
political distance between the coloniser and the colonised—what Partha 
Chatterjee terms the ‘rule of colonial difference’—the intersection of the two 
dissenting parties meant this divide was often dissolved and confined to colonial 
fantasy.
13
 Similar to the way the presence of ‘half-castes’ challenged colonial 
boundaries, metropolitan sympathisers posed problems for colonial regimes by 
exposing the fallibility of their administrations, effectively limiting the dispersion 
of imperial hegemony.
14
 Criticism during the interwar period undermined the 
increasingly flimsy imperial façade of white dominance yet as cases of official 
censorship, deportation, and whitewash (not to mention the colonial archive itself) 
                                                 
12
 Leela Gandhi, Affective Communities: anticolonial thought, fin-de-siècle Radicalism, and the 
politics of friendship (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2006), pp.9-10. 
13
 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: colonial and postcolonial histories (Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.10. 
14
 For discussion on how ‘half-castes’ disrupted colonial divisions see Damon Salesa, ‘Half-castes 
Between the Wars: colonial categories in New Zealand and Samoa’, New Zealand Journal of 
History (NZJH), Vol. 34, no. 1, 2000, pp.98-116.  
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illustrate, colonial governments were willing to go to great lengths to ensure that 
metropolitan dissenters would not ‘stir up the natives’.15 For officials, ‘natives’ 
were incapable of agitating on their own accord; when the blame was not directed 
at a ‘troublesome half-caste’ like Ta’isi O. F. Nelson, or a New Zealand-based 
‘trouble maker’ such as Albert Henry, it landed at the feet of sympathisers like 
Holland, or the lawyers Slipper and Fitzherbert, or in the case of the Cook Islands 
agitation, Auckland Unionist, T. J. (‘Pat’) Potter, who were all accused of unduly 
influencing the ‘natives’.16  
By combining metropolitan criticism with expressions of anticolonialism from 
within the colonial Pacific, the intellectual distance between the metropolitan 
centre and the colonial periphery collapses as well. This analytical move, 
promoted by scholars such as Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, has the 
advantage of overcoming the very Manichean colonial binaries of coloniser and 
colonised, civilised and uncivilised, that were arbitrarily developed and enforced 
by colonial administrations and enshrined in the histories of colonial rule by old-
fashioned imperial historians.
17
 In recent years, scholars have taken heed of 
Cooper and Stoler by placing ‘New Zealand and “other Pacific Islands” in a single 
interpretative frame’, as well as reaffirming New Zealand’s status as an ‘empire-
state’ in the Pacific.18  Driven largely by the work of Damon Salesa, there is a 
renewed impetus on acknowledging the ‘other half’ of New Zealand’s colonial 
history;
19
 a realisation that this history did not only encompass ‘domestic 
                                                 
15
 S. S. Allen to George Forbes, 10 Jun. 1930, PB Fitzherbert, IT1 446, EX 79/109, Archives New 
Zealand (ANZ).  
16
 For further examination of these types of racial attitudes in Samoa see Mary Boyd, ‘Racial 
Attitudes of New Zealand Officials in Western Samoa’, NZJH, Vol. 21, no. 1, 1987, pp.139-155. 
17
 See Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper, ‘Between Metropole and Colony: rethinking a 
research agenda’ in Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper (eds.), Tensions of Empire: colonial 
cultures in a bourgeois world (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp.1-56. 
18
 Frances Steel, Oceania Under Steam: sea transport and the cultures of colonialism, c. 1870-
1914 (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2011), p.8. See also Katerina 
Martina Teaiwa, ‘Our Sea of Phosphate: the diaspora of Ocean Island’, in Graham Harvey and 
Charles D. Thompson Jr. (eds.), Indigenous Diasporas and Dislocations (Aldershot & Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2005), pp.169-192; Damon Salesa, ‘New Zealand’s Pacific’, in Giselle 
Byrnes (ed.) The New Oxford History of New Zealand (Australia and New Zealand: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), pp.149-172; Sean Mallon, Kolokesa Māhina-Tuai and Damon Salesa 
(eds.), Tangata O Le Moana: New Zealand and the people of the Pacific (Wellington: Te Papa 
Press, 2012); Alice Te Punga Somerville, Once Were Pacific: Māori connections to Oceania 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), pp.xxii; Patricia O’Brien, ‘Ta‘isi O.F. Nelson 
and Sir Maui Pomare Samoans and Māori Reunited’, JPH, Vol. 49, no. 1, 2014, pp.26-49. 
19
 For antecedents to this concept see P. J. Stewart, ‘Annexation of the Kermadecs and New 
Zealand’s Policy in the Pacific’, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 28, no. 1, 1959, pp.67-71;  
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colonialism’, but also New Zealand’s fully-fledged overseas tropical empire 
comprising of Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and three out of the four Tokelauan 
atolls, not to mention the vast series of informal connections between New 
Zealand and the islands of Oceania.
20
 However, by acknowledging this imperial 
past, historians must also be wary of re-inscribing former colonial frameworks. 
That is, there is a danger when writing colonial history of treating core tenets of 
colonial regimes such as exploitation and white supremacism as unavoidable 
historical processes.
21
 This is why the shift to ‘new imperial history’ has taken 
notice of postcolonial and subaltern scholarship and scholarship such as Salesa’s 
on ‘New Zealand’s Pacific’ is punctuated with critical reflection tempering any 
possibility of a celebratory tone.  
Another way to avoid the perpetuation of colonial legacies is to bring the 
contemporary critics of colonialism into the frame. Bernard Porter, author of one 
of the original books on the history of British anti-imperialism,
22
 recently 
observed the ‘strangely neglected’ nature of the ‘“other side” of the imperial 
debate in Britain’, noting that for ‘every hundred books on imperialism published 
over the past fifty years, there can’t have been more than one on its critics.’23 
There are signs that the ‘scanty existing literature’, as Porter described it, is 
multiplying in the historiography of other former imperial powers.
24
 However 
                                                                                                         
Ross, New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific; Angus Ross (ed.), New Zealand’s Record in the 
Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century (New York, London: Hurst Humanities Press, 1969); F. 
H. Corner, ‘New Zealand and the South Pacific’, in T.C. Larkin (ed.) New Zealand’s External 
Relations (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1962), pp.130-153; Barrie 
Macdonald, Massey’s Imperialism and the Politics of Phosphate: Massey memorial lecture 1982 
(Palmerston North: Massey University, 1982).  
20
 Olohega, or Swains Island, the southern-most atoll of the island group, was and is still 
administered by the United States as part of American Samoa. For examples of New Zealand’s 
informal imperial links see D. K. Fieldhouse, ‘New Zealand, Fiji and the Colonial Office’, 
Historical Studies, Vol. 8, no. 30, 1958, pp.113-130; J. A. Salmond  ‘New Zealand and the New 
Hebrides’, in Peter Munz (ed.), The Feel of Truth: essays in New Zealand and Pacific history 
(Wellington: A. H. & A. W. Reed, 1969), pp.113-135; David Hilliard, God’s Gentlemen: a history 
of the Melanesian Mission, 1849-1942 (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 
1978). 
21
 Henry Yu, ‘The Cantonese Pacific, Anti-Asian Politics, and the Making and Unmaking of White 
Settler Nations’ (Keynote address), NZHA Conference, Otago University, Dunedin, 22 Nov. 2013.  
22
 Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire: British Radical attitudes to colonialism in Africa, 1895-1914 
(New York: St Martin’s Press, 1968). 
23
 Bernard Porter, ‘Review of Gregory Claeys, Imperial Sceptics’, Times Literary Supplement, 18 
Mar. 2011, pp.24-5.  
24
 Nicholas Owen, ‘Critics of Empire in Britain’, in Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), 
The Oxford History of the British Empire: the twentieth century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp.188-211; Kevin Grant, ‘Christian Critics of Empire: missionaries, lantern lectures, and 
the Congo reform campaign in Britain’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
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such a study has not been attempted within the historiography of New Zealand 
and the Pacific. The recent ‘turn to empire’ by Salesa and others, presents an 
opportunity to arrest Porter’s observation from the outset.   
Before the ‘other side’ of the imperial debate is defined, it is necessary to 
demarcate what the imperial side of the debate involved because the 
contemporary definition is not immediately obvious. I will be using imperialism 
to denote the act of a metropolitan State, in this case New Zealand, or other 
metropolitan actors, who sought to acquire a foothold, whether it be territorial or 
evangelical, in the Pacific, while colonialism is the actual practice of 
administering Pacific territories by colonial governments that occurred after 
imperial expansion. Yet it cannot be assumed that contemporaries understood 
imperialism in this way. This is because the term ‘imperialism’ did not enter 
popular usage until the 1890s,
25
 and when it did enter the British lexicon, as Porter 
has remarked, it encompassed ‘not so much a policy as a state of mind’. Radicals 
conflated it with popular jingoism; a mix of ‘Anglo-Saxon ‘manifest destiny’ and 
race-pride as well as a worshipping and glorification of power, force and war’, 
which they opposed bitterly.
26
 As Leela Gandhi argues, ‘imperialism was troped 
as shorthand for all that was wrong and iniquitous in the world’ by fin-de-siècle 
Radicals.
27
 Foremost of these British Radicals was J. A. Hobson whose wide-
ranging critique of imperialism, first published in 1902, became the inspiration to 
countless numbers of anti-imperialists.
28
 Hobson viewed imperialism as the 
product of capitalists who only sought to expand Britain’s borders to open up new 
markets to invest their surplus capital. Summed up by Nicholas Owen, the 
imperialism that Hobson attacked ‘was manipulated by parasitic interests’, where 
                                                                                                         
(JICH), Vol. 29, no. 2, 2001, pp.27-58; Jonathan Derrick, ‘The Dissenters: anti-colonialism in 
France, c. 1900-1940’, in Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (eds.), Promoting the Colonial Idea: 
propaganda and visions of Empire in France (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp.53-68; Sankar 
Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Julie Evans, 
Patricia Grimshaw, David Philips and Shurlee Swain, ‘Imperial Expansion and its Critics’, Equal 
Subjects, Unequal Rights: indigenous peoples in British settler colonies, 1830s-1910 (Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University, 2003), pp.17-39; Gregory Claeys, Imperial Sceptics: 
British critics of Empire, 1850-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); J. P. 
Daughton, ‘Behind the Imperial Curtain: international humanitarian efforts and the critique of 
French colonialism in the interwar years’, French Historical Studies, Vol. 34, no. 3, 2011, pp.503-
528.  
25
 Although the first appearance of the term can be traced to the 1870s, Eric Hobsbawm, The Age 
of Empire (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), p. 60. 
26
 Emphasis authors; Porter, Critics of Empire, p.88.  
27
 Gandhi, Affective Communities, p.8 
28
 J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: a study, 3
rd
 ed. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).  
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‘only a narrow coterie benefited from Empire’ despite the whole nation bearing 
the costs.
29
 Hobson’s arguments heavily influenced New Zealand’s twentieth-
century colonial critics even though his surplus capital argument did not 
necessarily apply to the New Zealand context. Some advocates for Pacific 
imperialism did have trading aims in mind, but these were not significant enough 
to make a lasting influence on policy. More to the point, as a new colony of its 
own with ample domestic resources, New Zealand hardly needed to seek new 
Oceanic markets to invest in.
30
   
Imperialism, as understood in New Zealand, was differentiated even further by 
the fact that the term was usually employed to convey ties to Britain. The French 
political scientist, André Siegfried, provides a useful model for understanding 
imperialism in New Zealand’s colonial context. On his visit to the Dominion in 
1899, Siegfried observed there were ‘two distinct currents of imperialism in the 
English colonies of the Pacific’. The first current he termed ‘greater imperialism’, 
which linked New Zealand and Australia to the British Empire, and the second 
current, the sub-imperialism I have been referring to thus far, he termed ‘local 
imperialism’, where New Zealand adopted its own ‘private attitude to Oceania’.31 
This type of imperialism may have been distinct from greater imperialism but was 
not opposed to it because, as Siegfried noted, its most regular manifestation was 
the desire to attain ‘“Oceania for the Anglo-Saxons.”’32 On the one hand, New 
Zealand’s local or sub-imperialists were motivated by a desire to defend their 
shores from hostile foreign powers, but on the other hand they were also moved 
by the same crude, jingoistic, race-pride that British Radicals rebelled against. Yet 
for all their imperial posturing, New Zealand was at once a colony of the British 
Empire, as well as its own empire-state. As Salesa has written, ‘Pākehā New 
Zealanders were colonisers, to be sure, but they were also in some ways 
colonised’.33 At all times New Zealand’s imperial autonomy was circumscribed 
by either the Colonial Office or the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) of 
the League of Nations. For this reason we can only refer to New Zealand, 
                                                 
29
 Owen, ‘Critics of Empire in Britain’, p.189. 
30
 Ross, New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific, pp.290-291.  
31
 André Siegfried, Democracy in New Zealand, trans. E. V. Burns, 2
nd
 ed., (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 1982), p.350. 
32
 Ibid., pp.350-351.  
33
 Salesa, ‘A Pacific Destiny’, p.103.   
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however damaging its colonial rule was to its Polynesian subjects, as a sub-
imperialist power.  
As for Porter’s ‘other side’ of the imperial debate, historians have employed 
different parameters for the subject. Although terms have varied there exists a 
general degree of uniformity amongst scholars over the need to distinguish 
between the anti-imperialism of the Marxist Left who, according to Barbara Bush, 
opposed ‘imperialism per se’ and critics of colonialism ‘who directed their 
energies to reforming rather than abolishing colonial rule’ and ultimately, 
remained ‘implicitly rooted in the dominant discourses of power.’ 34 Other 
scholars, such as Jonathan Derrick, have also omitted examining criticism of the 
material or self-centred variety.
35
 My study will employ a relatively loose 
definition of dissent which encompasses both anti-imperialists, colonial critics, 
and those who were opposed to colonialism for self-interested reasons. Apart from 
the New Zealand Communist Party (CPNZ), there were very few strict anti-
imperialists in New Zealand. By 1927, even the left-wing of the Labour 
movement had abandoned their advocacy for the dissolution of the British 
Empire, and replaced it with a desire to see a Socialist Commonwealth throughout 
the world.
36
 Operating with a larger working definition of dissent helps capture 
the wide array of perspectives New Zealand citizens held in regards to ‘their 
Pacific’.  
As well as contributing to the historiography of the colonial Pacific and New 
Zealand, this thesis adds to the wider field of international anti-imperial 
historiography. Out of this literature, Stephen Howe’s sketch of the typical British 
anticolonialist provides a useful framework for this study. According to Howe, 
British left-wing anticolonialists shared: a commitment to the principle of self-
determination for all subject peoples; an acknowledgement that all independence 
struggles were interdependent and a subsequent awareness that international 
cooperation was necessary; a belief in the equality of European and non-European 
people; and an understanding that colonialism had to first be eradicated in one’s 
own nation. A fifth claim, though less absolute, was that anticolonialism also 
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implied an anti-capitalist standpoint.
37
 Although many of New Zealand’s critics fit 
comfortably into Howe’s framework, there were just as many who did not. As 
Bush has argued, colonial criticism did not necessarily imply ideological 
opposition to imperialism, and this is most convincingly illustrated in the example 
of Christian dissent. Susan Thorne has argued that although Christian missionaries 
generally embraced the imperial ideal, this did not ‘preclude vociferous criticism 
of colonial practice’.38 Kevin Grant has furthered this argument by demonstrating 
that it was Christian humanitarianism, rather than the radicalism of Edmund Dene 
Morel, that drove the British Congo Reform campaign.
39
 Both these studies have 
reaffirmed the need to look beyond ‘traditional’ socialist anti-imperialism, and 
search for less unequivocal, but no less compassionate, attitudes to New Zealand’s 
Pacific imperialism.   
Contained within fin-de-siècle imperial critiques and interwar colonial criticism 
are a multitude of statements on metropolitan attitudes towards nationhood and 
national identity. A central concern of this thesis is to reinforce that as well as 
being fashioned in opposition to a growing number of immigrant Chinese, ‘White 
New Zealand’ was also created against a multi-coloured Pacific. Just as Stoler and 
Cooper contend that ‘Europe was made by its imperial projects’, so too was New 
Zealand.
40
 Implicit in many of the debates over Pacific imperialism were appeals 
to settler nationalism. Edward Said and other postcolonial historians have 
proclaimed, ‘In nationalism, there is always an “other.”’41 Like European imperial 
powers and their colonies, New Zealand’s Pacific territories ‘constituted an 
imaginary and physical space in which the inclusions and exclusions built into the 
nations of citizenship, sovereignty, and participation were worked out.’42 In the 
case of the Pacific, the ‘we-they’ opposition served to promote a vision of New 
Zealand that included Māori but excluded other Pacific peoples, or peoples who 
happened to be residing in the Pacific like Chinese and Indian labourers, deemed 
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racially inferior.
43
 Imperial dissenters were at the forefront of these debates. This 
thesis shows that in the nineteenth-century in particular, criticism was more 
regularly inspired by an aversion towards closer contact with Pacific populations 
than from any concern for their well-being. 
Treating ‘New Zealand’ as an analytical whole, as has been done thus far, does 
not properly capture colonial reality. Tony Ballantyne has called for a greater 
appreciation of place and space within New Zealand historiography.
44
 Different 
parts of New Zealand experienced different relationships with the Pacific. Salesa 
has explained that ‘[p]ublic interest in a Pacific empire for New Zealand did not 
circulate among all New Zealand subjects in uniform ways’. According to Salesa, 
interest ‘was usually specific, concentrated in certain locations or among 
particular groups’, groups he labelled ‘domestic colonies of imperial interest.’ 
These ‘domestic colonies of imperial interest’ did not constitute ‘diffuse or 
amorphous configurations of “public opinion”, but generally clustered around 
concrete formations – companies, banks, churches, cabinets, correspondence 
networks, readerships and political groups.’45  
The same line of argument can be made for colonial critics; that is, there were 
domestic colonies of anti-imperial interest. Individuals and organisations in New 
Zealand were drawn to different kinds of colonial injustices depending on their 
own interests. For example, the Labour movement was more readily drawn to 
issues of labour exploitation and naturally led the campaign against indentured 
labour. Moreover, individuals and organisations would similarly not comment on 
certain colonial activities due to conflicts of interest. Here, the relative silence of 
the New Zealand’s Protestant Churches is illustrative. And despite having a long 
history of falling on the side of Pacific labourers, Peter Fraser’s Labour Party of 
the 1940’s decided not to act strongly on issues of Cook Island labour exploitation 
because they were now in Government and wanted to distance themselves from 
the Communist Party which Henry and the Cook Islands Progressive Association 
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(CIPA) had allied with. This illustrates that every debate on Pacific colonialism 
was highly contingent and clouded by realpolitik, there was generally more to 
colonial criticism than just personal conviction. 
Aware of the need to address this topic from a perspective that incorporated as 
many non-official, or ‘ordinary’, voices as possible, I intended to use the official 
colonial archive sparingly. However I soon found myself, like countless historians 
before me, scouring the Island Territories files at Archives New Zealand. I 
discovered the official records were important depositories for colonial dissent 
precisely because the colonial authorities were keeping track of what aspects of 
their administrations were being criticised. Files were kept on individual critics, 
and in many cases, the most compelling criticism could be found in letters and 
petitions to the Government. That said, I have complemented what I have found in 
the official archive with ‘public opinion’ found in newspapers, magazines and 
pamphlets.
46
 Yet the archive, both official and unofficial, can only capture so 
much; I acknowledge that the existing traces of criticism still only convey a 
fraction of real life dissent. There is every possibility that a lot of criticism went 
unheard, and this is especially the case when it came to the smaller Pacific 
territories, like Niue, Tokelau, and Nauru, that did not capture the attention of the 
nation in the same way as Samoa and the Cook Islands (at least the islands of 
Rarotonga and Aitutaki) did. Though being ‘open’ to a wider scope encompassing 
the entirety of ‘New Zealand’s Pacific’, the final scope of this thesis has been 
influenced by the available material. The numerous critiques relating to internal 
Pākehā colonialism of Aotearoa New Zealand fall outside the reach of this 
research also. The latter topic demands further consideration in its own right, but 
as most critics of Pacific colonialism held simultaneous views on colonial 
injustice involving Māori, I have acknowledged this when appropriate. 
Finally, even though this study arguably goes against the grain of the Canberra 
school of Pacific Islands historiography, it has been driven by the same ethos that 
drove the original adherents. Davidson himself was a colonial critic, he possessed 
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‘a commitment to decolonisation, well before it became fashionable.’47 According 
to one contemporary, his ‘pro-“native” sympathies and commitment to indigenous 
self-determination’ did not make him overly popular with ‘the people who 
mattered’ during his career at Cambridge in the 1940s.48 Borofsky has rightfully 
emphasised the importance of writing about the colonial period ‘without getting 
entangled… in the colonial entanglements themselves’.49 I hope to prove that a 
focus on the metropolitan side of the colonial equation does not necessarily 
involve a re-centring of the colonisers, or tacit approval of the ‘colonising 
project’, or even neo-colonialism, rather I argue that by focusing on the 
metropole, through the eyes of the critics, we can open up a novel lens through 
which to approach the colonial Pacific. Like Graeme Whimp’s scholarship on the 
New Zealand Resident Commissioner in the Cook Islands, Walter Edward 
Gudgeon, I see my work ‘as one half of a project the other half of which, the re-
centring of other participants, may more sensitively and accurately be taken up by 
others.’50  
*** 
This thesis is divided into three sections that aim to convey the relatively steady-
stream of imperial criticism that emerged within New Zealand whenever Pacific 
imperialism or colonialism was debated. The first chapter covers the years 1883 to 
1919 and argues that even though this was the period generally referred to as the 
era of ‘new imperialism’, New Zealand’s citizens were, mainly for a mixture of 
pragmatic and anxiety related reasons, far from unanimous in their response to 
top-down schemes of annexation or federation of Pacific territories. Annexation 
of the Cook Islands and Niue was tenable for many (although some thought it 
unnecessary), however, federation with Fiji—with their larger, and darker, 
population—proved less acceptable.    
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The second chapter reveals that once formal control of Pacific territories was 
assumed, New Zealand’s colonial policy and administrative record were widely 
criticised for its shortcomings, perceived or otherwise. The Government’s policy 
of indentured labour in Samoa, its decision to send the warship Tutanekai to Fiji 
in response to an Indian strike, and the mishandling of indigenous agitation for 
self-determination in Samoa and the Cook Islands will be used as case studies. 
These examples demonstrate that critics framed their arguments around a concept 
of ‘British justice’ that was not extended to the non-white populations of ‘New 
Zealand’s Pacific’. New Zealand’s colonial administrations were more than 
willing to grant cultural sovereignty to their colonial subjects, yet they were not 
prepared to hand over political sovereignty despite extensive protests.            
The final chapter addresses the interconnection between anticolonial movements 
and metropolitan sympathisers; an illustration of Leela Gandhi’s ‘politics of 
friendship’ characterised by ‘dissident crosscultural collaboration’.51 Here I argue 
that since suitable constitutional avenues for airing colonial grievances were 
denied to the colonial populations, indigenous peoples were almost forced to turn 
to ‘white’ critics who, as recognised citizens or on account of the colour of their 
skin, were able to address grievances on behalf of the colonised in national and 
international arenas. Ironically, by having to turn to metropolitan sympathisers, 
indigenous anticolonial movements were able to gain momentum that might have 
otherwise been absent. It was through these anticolonial networks that the divides 
between colony and metropole were bridged most demonstrably. My study 
culminates in 1948 when Henry and the CIPA severed ties with Pat Potter and the 
Communist Auckland trade unions and, in the words of Mason, took ‘things off at 
a tangent with a co-operative trading venture’ backed by the New Zealand 
Government.
52
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Chapter One 
‘Greater New Zealand’: 
Questioning New Zealand’s  
‘Pacific Destiny’ 
 
‘At both a practical and theoretical level, anti-colonialism  
goes back to the beginnings of colonialism itself.’1 
Since the time of European exploration in the South Pacific, visions of Pacific 
grandeur were projected onto the islands of Aotearoa.
2
 Nowhere did the image of 
New Zealand as ‘Britain of the South Seas’ sit more comfortably than in the 
minds of the ‘great men’ of the newly created colony. Salesa has noted that since 
the beginning of New Zealand’s history as a British colony, ‘prominent colonials, 
from all walks of life and regions, had yearned to bring one or other South Pacific 
islands under New Zealand rule.’3 Individuals like George Grey, Julius Vogel, 
Robert Stout and Richard Seddon sought to add to their personal legacies through 
Oceanic imperialism. Yet this story of New Zealand’s ‘Pacific destiny’, widely 
propagated throughout the historiography, is overly top-heavy.
4
 It privileges 
official documents and papers, and gets its remit from the thoughts and 
proclamations of ‘prominent colonials’—and New Zealand Herald newspaper 
editorials—without due attention to dissenting voices. The narrative’s wide appeal 
has led to conclusions such as the following by Keith Sinclair. Reviewing Angus 
Ross’s New Zealand Aspirations in the Pacific in the Nineteenth Century, Sinclair 
wrote: ‘the most important theoretical issue which Ross explores is one of motive: 
why was it that public opinion in New Zealand was so unanimously 
imperialistic?’5  
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This chapter challenges Sinclair’s summation by widening the frame of 
reference. While ‘prominent colonials’ may well have been ‘howling empire from 
an empty coast’, it is less certain that the not-so-prominent citizens of New 
Zealand shared this feeling.
6
 By looking at the wide-range of public discourse that 
surrounded debates over New Zealand’s Pacific imperialism in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth centuries, the rhetoric of grandstanding politicians, largely 
accepted by subsequent historians, will be somewhat moderated. This is not to 
argue that large sections of the public did not endorse the ambitions of its leaders, 
but rather to show that other opinions existed, and thus should not be marginalised 
from the historiography. Taking newspaper opinion from this time period as a 
measure of public opinion (imperfect as it is), with its myriad of responses to New 
Zealand’s involvement in the Pacific, leads to the conclusion that it would be 
misleading to label the New Zealand public as ‘unanimously imperialistic’. In the 
process this chapter extends the largely forgotten argument made by Merz Tate 
and Fidele Foy almost half a century ago, by further demonstrating that there was 
no ‘unanimity of domestic opinion on the wisdom of annexing Pacific islands or 
creating a South Sea federation…’.7 
To demonstrate the existence of imperial dissent and assess the extent to which 
Pacific ambitions were challenged, this chapter follows the ebbs and flows of 
press discourse over three key events, or periods of time, when Pacific 
imperialism captured public attention. The first of these is the passing of the 
Annexation and Confederation Act in 1883 which was part of an (ultimately 
failed) attempt at implementing an Australasian Monroe Doctrine, but also a 
signal of New Zealand’s own imperial ambitions.8 Next is Seddon’s turn-of-the-
century imperialism, including the annexation of the Cook Islands and Niue in 
1901 as well as failed schemes for wider Fijian or Polynesian federation. The final 
stage is the granting of the League of Nations Mandate for German Samoa to New 
Zealand in 1919-1920 when ‘anti-imperial’ critiques began to first feature with 
the rise of Labour.  
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Accurately recovering nineteenth-century public opinion can be a problematic 
task. By relying on newspaper editorials as its primary source, this chapter does 
not purport to be a history from below, nor does it claim to effectively capture 
public opinion. Social-science historians have convincingly dismantled the naïve 
assumption ‘that public opinion is identical with public presentation of opinion.’9 
This assumption, despite the contemporary rhetoric of newspaper editors 
themselves, would be particularly inaccurate for nineteenth-century New 
Zealand.
10
  For the years 1840 to 1880 Ross Harvey has speculatively argued that 
since newspapers readership was low, ‘perhaps in the order of 5-8%’ of the 
population, editorials could not have influenced public opinion to any 
considerable extent.
11
 Similarly, Patrick Day has characterised newspaper reading 
in New Zealand as primarily an upper-class activity for much of the nineteenth-
century.
12
  
By the late nineteenth-century however, the pattern of newspaper publication 
and readership had changed. Day has found that the growth in newspaper 
circulation from the hundreds to the thousands in the 1860s and 1870s, alongside 
increased publication frequency, and a reduction in price eroded some of the 
impediments to readership and gave the growing number of working class 
migrants greater access to newspaper opinion.
13
 Furthermore, the increase in daily 
newspapers meant the New Zealand reader became exposed to wider perspectives. 
This included, for the first time in New Zealand, a labour newspaper in the form 
of the Grey River Argus (to be joined by the Maoriland Worker in 1910). Despite 
operating under tight business models, editorials remained highly political through 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The new commercially-oriented 
nature of the news press meant editors no longer felt bound to their political 
patrons, and gained the freedom to profess their own ideology or political 
beliefs.
14
 Although Day argues this occurred most noticeably in regards to 
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newspapers stand on the provincial question, this chapter will suggest that the 
Pacific imperial question from the 1880s also provides an indication that 
individual editorial discourse was flourishing.      
Debating Confederation and Annexation 
The Confederation and Annexation Bill was introduced on behalf of Sir George 
Grey in June 1883. If passed, this Bill would have authorised the New Zealand 
Government to annex any ‘unclaimed’ Pacific territory providing that the 
indigenous leaders of the territory or territories in question agreed.
15
 On the one 
hand, the Bill was a reaction to the growing presence of France and Germany in 
the Pacific. It was part of an Australasian-wide initiative to ensure Oceania would 
remain predominantly Anglo-Saxon. On the other hand it needs to be viewed as 
another attempt by a leading colonial man to fulfil ‘New Zealand’s Pacific 
Destiny’. The latter reading is particularly apposite given the man behind the Bill 
was definitely no stranger to schemes of Pacific imperialism.  Grey’s enthusiasm 
for ‘New Zealand’s Pacific destiny’ shone during his speech on the Bill in 
Parliament. He proclaimed, ‘I think that New Zealand has been ordained by 
Nature virtually to be the future Queen of the Pacific.’16 Grey’s enthusiasm was at 
least partly reflected in the nation’s imagination. The Waikato Times felt that 
‘annexation mania’ had ‘taken so firm a hold on the public mind’ with supporters 
adopting Grey’s measures with ‘feverish, anxious eagerness’ rather than ‘in a 
calm judicial spirit’.17  
As Grey’s statement implies, there was a nationalistic strain to the movement. 
The Colonial Office would have the ultimate say in any decision, but by allowing 
New Zealand to embark on its own foreign policy the Bill would have extended 
New Zealand’s sovereign rights to an unprecedented degree.  Unlike Vogel’s and 
Grey’s earlier Pacific schemes, the Bill was passed in August after several spirited 
readings. At this point, the only obstacle to New Zealand empire-building was 
approval from the Imperial Government. However, the Bill did not receive a 
favourable hearing; the Colonial Office downplayed the threat to Australasian 
security, while it was clear they had their own geo-political concerns to contend 
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with elsewhere. Nonetheless, in abstract terms, the passing of the Confederation 
and Annexation Act (1883) signified the domestic realisation of what Siegfried 
would later term New Zealand’s ‘local-imperialism’.18 Because of this, the debate 
over the Bill provides a suitable departure point for examining whether Young’s 
statement regarding the origins of anti-colonialism applies in the New Zealand 
context.    
A number of significant international currents emerged during the 1880s that 
potentially influenced New Zealand’s local imperial discourse. Foremost of these 
was what is now termed ‘new imperialism’. As Andrew Porter has written, these 
were years of ‘hectic European expansion.’19 Territorial acquisition in this period 
was justified on the basis that imperialism was a benign, regulated process that 
brought ‘civilisation’ to the colonised populations. The ‘Scramble for Africa’, 
formalised by the 1884 Berlin Conference, was mirrored to a lesser degree in 
Oceania. Germany, France and the United States competed with Britain to acquire 
‘unclaimed’ Pacific territories. The effect was deeply unnerving for the 
Australasian colonies. However, as well as being a reflection of their insecurity, 
Australasian attempts to act on their own accord were also a demonstration of 
pride. The colonies believed that by annexing Pacific Islands they were 
contributing to the glorious expansion of the British Empire.  
Less directly influential on New Zealand, but no less important for anti-imperial 
discourse globally in this decade, was the development of ‘new unionism’ and the 
‘socialist revival’. By the 1880s anti-imperial radicalism had become a significant, 
if small, sub-culture in Britain due to the socialism of the Radical party.
20
 The 
same cannot be said for New Zealand as the first socialist organisations in New 
Zealand did not appear until the late 1890s. The Radicals’ opposition to the 
Australasian colonies’ plans for Pacific annexation did feature in the nation’s 
press though was routinely dismissed.
21
  ‘New unionism’ had more of an effect in 
New Zealand as trades and labour councils began developing in the 1880s. But 
even here, growth was sluggish due to the depression, and they had not yet 
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adopted an explicitly socialist agenda.
22
  There were perhaps signs of anti-
imperial engagement at the end of 1883. The Thames Advertiser published an 
editorial on a new ‘party’ called the Trades and Labour Council which planned to 
launch in 1884. One of the policies of this new movement calling itself ‘Labour’ 
was a statement that ‘It will oppose any confederation and annexation policy 
similar to that proposed at the Sydney Convention.’23 It is difficult to tell whether 
this opposition was out of principle or expediency. Even if these global trends 
were acknowledged in New Zealand, the extent to which they actually influenced 
commentators’ attitudes to the annexation question is difficult to ascertain. A 
more obvious driver of criticism was the pragmatic considerations that arose out 
of the depression, the realisation that New Zealand was still an undeveloped 
colony itself, and the derogatory characterisation of Pacific Islanders.  
The majority of opposition to the 1883 Bill was parochial in nature, and did not 
bear the imprint of international anti-imperialism. John Holmes, MP for 
Christchurch South, encapsulated the feeling of parliamentary opposition when he 
declared that ‘the whole question for the House to consider is, Will it pay?24 
Criticism of the scheme largely appealed to this sense of rationality; a Pacific 
Empire was too grand an idea to befit a young colony. For example, Legislative 
Councillor Morgan Stanislaus Grace said ‘It is one thing for a colony within its 
own limits to enter upon an enterprising policy, and another thing for half a 
million of people to enter upon a Colonial-Imperial policy, if I may so describe 
it.’25 The division of opinion in both the upper and lower Houses illustrates that 
even amongst the colony’s ‘leading men’, there was no unanimous desire for 
Pacific expansion. 
Wider public debate around the Bill was generally restrained. Future imperial 
debates would draw significantly more attention and opprobrium. Those against 
Confederation and Annexation often only opposed the Bill because there were 
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more pressing matters to address on the domestic front. The Christchurch Press 
believed that ‘most people’ would feel ‘that all these projects are just a little out of 
place, while so much yet remains to be done to develop the resources of the 
territory we already possess.’26 In Taranaki, a precursor to the Reform Party, the 
Political Reform Association, declared ‘That Confederation and Annexation is 
unsuited for this Colony at present.’27 The fiscally conservative Association 
rallied against rising Government expenditure so their policy is unsurprising. And 
although it was not mentioned, the memory of Parihaka and earlier colonial strife 
between Māori and Pākehā in the region would have surely weighed on the minds 
of the Association as they were deciding whether to enter into new, uncertain, 
relationships with indigenous peoples. Similarly, leader of the Opposition William 
Montgomery, who had a troubled relationship with Grey, was reported to have 
described the aging statesman’s plans for Pacific annexation a ‘dream and 
delusion, which, if attempted to carry it out, would prove a snare.’28 
Montgomery’s criticism of Grey’s plans was delivered during a speech where the 
depression and concerns over growing public debt were his main themes. His 
attack on Grey’s Pacific Island scheme was linked to his desire for fiscal 
conservatism rather than any outright aversion to the principal of annexation. The 
Wanganui Chronicle believed that opponents to the Bill ‘would have New 
Zealand “mind her own business,” of which they do not reckon confederation and 
annexation to form a part.’29 
With its close ties to the MP William Hutchison, who stated that there was 
‘really nothing of greatness’ in Pacific Island schemes, the Wanganui Chronicle 
made the strongest stand against the Bill.
30
 It labelled it ‘entirely worthless’, and 
was critical of the impression it made ‘at Home that New Zealand is inclined to 
act by herself in the matter of Annexation rather than in conjunction with the other 
colonies.’31 It accused supporters of annexation as only having ‘a very hazy 
notion of the part which New Zealand ought to play’. Pro-annexationist views 
were ‘not only ill-defined’ but they ‘frequently profess to hold views which are 
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more or less contradictory of each other.’ The Chronicle did not subscribe to the 
‘trade follows the flag’ theory; although admitting it did ‘place a value, though an 
undefined one, on commerce with the Pacific Islands’, it believed ‘that any 
advantage likely to accrue from that source will come to New Zealand without 
seeking to extend the borders of her Government.’32 In a similar vein the Waikato 
Times, referring mostly to Australasian support for Queensland’s annexation of 
New Guinea, was not convinced of the trade benefits of the move, nor did it think 
much of the perceived threat to security. ‘This sounds very much like bosh’, the 
editorial announced. It argued that if there was such a threat then ‘the best thing 
for us to do will be to look after our own safety, and not burden ourselves with the 
care of innumerable dependencies, which are bound to drain our resources, and 
which would be just as likely to fall into the hands of an enemy then as they are 
now.’33 These doubts may of course reflect a regional bias. Pacific Islands trading 
was largely dominated by Auckland firms so they had plenty to gain from a 
reduction in tariffs, while the rest of the country’s prospects for trade were not as 
prominent. 
Of particular interest to this study are the critics who justified their opposition on 
racial grounds. Race did not play as big an issue in the debates during this period 
as it would at the turn of the century and in the 1920s when the notion of ‘White 
New Zealand’ was at its apogee, but it did feature in debate. For example, Colonel 
Robert Trimble of Taranaki asked the House why would they ‘propose to make 
fellow-citizens’ with ‘a race of men’ who ‘have not hitherto advanced in 
civilization at all.’ In a statement at odds with later opinions of Chinese in New 
Zealand, Trimble commented, ‘we keep out the civilized Chinese, and we bring in 
the barbarous Pacific islanders.’34 To Trimble, the Pacific Islands possessed ‘no 
people worth governing’.35 A brief comment in the Otago Witness accused the 
Pacific Islands Annexation Committee of taking too many precautions ‘for the 
benefit of the natives’ while not showing enough concern ‘for the interests of 
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Australasia.’36  In Parliament, several MPs asked why New Zealand would go to 
all this trouble just to ‘defend a lot of cannibals’?37  
Race would go on to play a role in shaping the attitudes of critics towards the 
Pacific in the decades to follow. Despite the Imperial Government’s rebuke and 
the prevalence of sober-minded editorials, ‘annexation mania’ appeared to 
continue. Negotiations to seek control of Fiji, Tonga, New Hebrides, Samoa and 
the Cook Island group continued intermittently until the turn of the century. These 
ambitions were eventually realised when the Cook Islands were placed under a 
British protectorate overseen by a New Zealand appointed Resident agent that 
would eventually develop into a New Zealand territory in 1901 along with Niue 
when Britain submitted to New Zealand’s imperial desires.  
‘Seddonia’ 
Seddon’s vision for a ‘Greater New Zealand’ was only partially fulfilled at the 
turn of the century with the annexation of the Cook Islands and Niue. In the eyes 
of many sceptical observers, this territorial expansion left little to brag about. The 
Timaru Herald wrote that New Zealanders ‘allowed the Premier to have his Cook 
Island toy, but they took no interest in the matter, except in as far as they 
entertained some misgivings as to the outcome of the venture.’38 Seddon had 
much grander plans of course; he envisioned a Polynesian federation in the style 
of Vogel before him.
39
 Though the public may have allowed the annexation of the 
Cook Islands and Niue to pass with little fanfare, plans for a more substantial 
Polynesian federation drew much wider interest and opposition. In some respects, 
the turn of the century debates mirrored the concerns expressed during the 
Confederation and Annexation Bill; people deemed Seddon’s schemes overly 
ambitious for a young colony, while the fear of escalating costs was a consistent 
refrain. Yet in other respects, criticism had a new edge. This, after all, was the era 
of ‘White Australasia’, and questions of race were at the forefront of people’s 
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minds. Critics of the schemes openly expressed their discomfort at the prospect of 
incorporating large non-white populations within New Zealand’s domain.    
In response to Seddon’s plans, conservative colonists reaffirmed their 
commitment to a ‘White New Zealand’. An Evening Post editorial invited New 
Zealand’s workers ‘to pay some attention’ to the proposed annexation and 
federation given the likely effect such a move would have on employment. Not 
known for its concern for the working class, the newspaper nonetheless referred to 
the ‘abundance of coloured labour’ in the Islands and remarked how this posed a 
threat to ‘the white labour of New Zealand’.40 The New Zealand Herald came out 
against plans proposed by Seddon, and encouraged by Fijian colonists, for Fijian 
federation. The newspaper noted the ‘preponderating sentiment’ in the Australian 
Commonwealth was for a ‘white Australia’ forgoing imported ‘black’ plantation 
labour. The Herald endorsed Australia’s policy believing it was necessary given 
‘the many complicated problems which arise when a white and a black population 
participate in the same government.’ The editorial concluded that ‘New Zealand 
could not take in Fiji as a part of our political administrative system’ primarily 
because of the ‘disastrous confusion’ that would occur if they treated ‘the native 
Fijians as we treat the comparatively small number of Maoris which we have 
amongst us.’41 Amongst other reasons, the acknowledged leader of the opposition, 
Captain William Russell, opposed an Island federation due to the fear that ‘the 
coloured population’ comprising Māori as well as Cook Islanders and Fijians, 
would ‘dominate us in our legislation’.42 Citing the evidence given by a Wesleyan 
Reverend W. Slade who wrote that Fijians were not ‘true men’ due to their lack of 
‘character’, Russell questioned why these types of people, ‘devoid of truthfulness 
or courage’ should be allowed into ‘our Parliament’.43  
White supremacy and the derogatory depiction of Pacific peoples was plainly 
apparent in an article that first appeared in the Sydney Bulletin, titled ‘Annexing 
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the Kanaka’, and was widely published throughout New Zealand.44 The article 
was not out of place in a newspaper that carried the masthead slogan ‘Australia 
for the White Man’, but its wide exposure suggests that it tapped into popular 
sentiment in New Zealand. The Bulletin article began by noting that ‘in his desire 
to swell up and bloat out at any cost, Richard of Kumara is trying hard to build up 
a Maoriland Federation or empire in the Pacific, and to increase the population of 
his province by a large annexation of niggers and sundries.’ The ‘niggers and 
sundries’ the newspaper referred to were both Cook Islanders and Fijians, and the 
author went on to doubt ‘whether an enlargement which arises through the 
annexation of inferior races is the kind of enlargement that is worth having’. The 
piece also conveyed the often repeated working-class concern about the 
deleterious effect that supposedly ‘inferior races’ would have on the availability 
of white jobs given their status as low wage labour. New Zealand’s total 
population was close to a million at this point, while the Māori population was 
around 40,000. If wider federation with Fiji (a territory that the Sydney Bulletin 
article so pleasantly reminded readers possessed ‘about 120,000 niggers’) and 
other Pacific territories was fulfilled, and political representation and citizenship 
rights were granted, there was the real sense that the ideal of a ‘White New 
Zealand’ was under threat. 
Given the unofficial Labour newspaper the Grey River Argus was one of the 
organs that published ‘Annexing the Kanaka’, it is an indication that the working-
classes had not yet been imbued with the kind of internationalist anti-imperialism 
that drew favour amongst the Left in later decades. After offering no editorial 
comment on Pacific annexation in 1883, the Grey River Argus was highly 
sceptical of plans to confederate with Fiji and called for a referendum on the 
matter before any decision was made.
45
 The Argus asked ‘Where is any advantage 
going to come to New Zealand out of an arrangement of the kind?’  However, as 
in 1883, there were outliers who possessed sympathetic attitudes towards Pacific 
Islanders. The parliamentarian John Rigg, a trade union leader and socialist, was 
one of these. He voiced concern at the lack of consultation with the Cook Islands 
Parliament over annexation and also bemoaned New Zealand’s track-record when 
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it came to Māori land issues; he worried whether New Zealand ‘shall be able to 
deal satisfactorily with the lands of other natives about whom we know so very 
little?’46  
Pragmatic and ‘greater imperialistic’ concerns meant New Zealand’s willingness 
to undertake the responsibility for islands already under British protection was 
questioned.
47
 One correspondent to the Evening Post called the ‘whole thing… 
vulgar and unstatesmanlike’, believing New Zealand to have ‘no power to annex 
territory – if these little Cook islets and atolls can be called territory – only 
through the Government of Great Britain…’.48 Yet interpreting Seddon’s aims as 
anti-imperial (in the sense of ‘greater-imperialism’) was wide of the mark. As D. 
K. Fieldhouse has reminded us, ‘Seddon’s period as an empire-builder came at the 
high moment of British imperial sentiment’.49 The liberal Auckland Star ran 
newspaper articles praising Chamberlain’s speech titled ‘We are all Imperialists’, 
nor can it be forgotten that New Zealand had demonstrably displayed its loyalty 
by sending men to South Africa.
50
 The Anglican press celebrated the 
formalisation of British imperial presence in the Solomon Islands; ‘The Empire 
has thus taken one more step forward; the Church must not be slow to follow it. 
Forward!’51 Even New Zealand’s fledgling socialist organisations experienced a 
decrease in numbers as adherents defected to the ‘imperial’ side.52 As a result, 
Seddon made sure to avoid the impression that he was the selfish imperial partner 
seeking to break rank and create an empire of his own; rather, in an act of imperial 
solidarity, he emphasised New Zealand’s willingness to take on the British burden 
in Oceania for them.  
In private, Seddon was most attracted by the trade opportunities that federation 
with Fiji would present. Wary of being overshadowed by the new Australian 
Commonwealth, the prospect of monopolising the Fijian market had obvious 
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allure.
53
 At the same time, Seddon sought those quintessential ‘new imperial’ 
qualities of status and prestige. He publically denied that Cook Island and Niue 
annexation was ‘not actuated by jealousy towards Australia’,54 but there was a 
widespread belief that Seddon looked toward creating a Pacific Island federation 
as New Zealand’s bulwark or counterpoint to the Australian Commonwealth.55 
This move was not overly popular with the New Zealand public. Critics were 
quick to note that the late Liberal leader and Premier John Ballance had argued 
against federation with Australia by saying that ‘1,200 miles separating New 
Zealand from Australia were 1,200 good reasons against federating’.56 Yet 
Rarotonga was almost 2000 miles away from Auckland.
57
 The general feeling was 
that the New Zealand federation scheme would come off a distant second best to 
the Australian Commonwealth.  
Finally, even if one accepts the argument that there was little genuine opposition 
to the plans, by the same token, there was little in the way of public enthusiasm 
for the move. The Timaru Herald believed ‘New Zealanders are perfectly content 
to let the islands of the Pacific alone if they are under the protection of the 
Imperial Government.’58 The Christchurch Press concluded ‘we certainly think 
New Zealand is likely to have its hands quite full during the next few years in 
looking after its own affairs, without taking the government of Tonga, Fiji, and 
the Cook Archipelago on its shoulders.’59 In 1901 the Tuapeka Times perhaps 
came closest to conveying the general feeling throughout New Zealand when it 
reported that:  
The thirst for annexation, which is the natural complement of a robust 
Imperialism of which, as a matter of course, Mr Seddon is the loudest exponent in 
the colony, seems to have disappeared with almost the same suddenness that it 
manifested itself. The wild outburst of excitement in the House of Representatives 
that followed the announcement of the Premier that he had annexed the Cook 
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group of Islands in the Pacific, consisting of Rarotonga and six other small 
islands, was ludicrous to the point of foolishness.
60
 
Regardless of the prevalence of this view, the potential for federation and 
annexation did not simply die out after 1901. In the years that followed Cook 
Island and Niue annexation, comment and speculation continued among the 
colonial elite in regards to ‘acquiring’ Fiji and Tonga. In 1903 a Parliamentary 
Delegation embarked on a Pacific sojourn to assess for themselves the relative 
merits of their Island neighbours. James Allen’s account of the trip left zero doubt 
about the prospecting and surveying motivations driving this imperial speculation. 
Even though Allen was critical of New Zealand’s role in aiding the (‘inevitable’) 
population decline in the Cook Islands and Niue, it was only because this meant 
New Zealand would lose out on valuable manpower in the future.
61
 Equally, he 
saw great trading potential in Tonga, it had the ‘best harbour in the Pacific’, and 
encouraged the formalisation of ties with the territory.
62
 Allen’s acquisitiveness 
remained a feature of his politics when his Government championed the 
annexation of Samoa after the War. But in this case, as others before it, the 
dominant viewpoint was not allowed to remain unchallenged.   
Samoa: ‘The Brightest Pearl in New Zealand’s 
Chaplet’?63 
New Zealand’s first act of the Great War concerned the Pacific. In what Frank 
Corner termed an ‘atavistic flurry of imperialism’, the German colony of Samoa 
was ‘seized’ by a New Zealand expeditionary force in 1914, and was ruled by a 
New Zealand military administration on behalf of Britain until the close of the 
War.
64
 This was the closest New Zealand had yet come to acquiring these long 
sought after islands. The post-War fate of Samoa was debated from the time 
Prime Minister William Massey and his War-time Deputy Sir Joseph Ward 
attended the Imperial Conference in London in 1916 until the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919. It was widely felt that New Zealand had a logical claim to the 
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islands given that they were already under New Zealand military control, yet with 
the establishment of the League of Nations, the imperial climate was changing 
and nothing was guaranteed. By 1918, Labour’s ‘no annexations’ campaign 
attempted to thwart New Zealand’s imperial destiny once again. As it was, the 
Versailles Peace Conference placed German Samoa in New Zealand’s hands, to 
be administered as a League of Nations ‘Class C’ Mandate on behalf of Great 
Britain. Notably, this decision was made without consulting the Samoan people 
who were not at all enamoured with New Zealand rule after the military 
administration’s mishandling of the influenza epidemic that caused the death of 
22% of the Samoan population in 1918-19.
65
 Although New Zealand had not 
technically acquired the territory in any formal sense, becoming a Mandatory 
Power was interpreted by New Zealand’s leaders as the next best thing.66 Before 
the more cogent anti-imperial campaigning by the Labour Party is examined, it is 
useful to locate some of the earlier attitudes towards Samoa. As the previous 
debates plainly suggest, one did not have to be an anti-imperialist to question the 
Government’s imperial ambitions.   
In anticipation of Massey and Ward’s participation in the 1916 Conference, the 
Dunedin Sun journalist Mark Cohen issued a special circular ‘inviting 
representative men to express their opinions’ on five questions relating to imperial 
matters.
67
 Of these questions, one had direct relevance to this study: whether 
representatives of the Dominions should be able to claim that the colonial 
possessions of the enemy be administered by the Dominion that is closest to that 
territory. Forty responses were published by Cohen, offering a rare, and relatively 
unfiltered, snapshot of public opinion on the Samoan question (even if, as Sinclair 
has written, it is admitted that ‘in those days, [public opinion] meant “middle-
class” or “respectable” opinions: those of churchmen, businessmen, 
politicians’).68 While many of the respondents replied without hesitation that New 
Zealand should take control of the islands, a significant proportion also expressed 
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some reservations. Perhaps this kind of measured deliberation was to be expected 
from ‘level-headed’ representative men, but the range of possible outcomes 
offered did not exactly present an image of jingoistic confidence.  
It was not uncommon for respondents to defer their answer to the future dictates 
of Imperial interest. The Dunedin Barrister Roger Gilkison represented this 
feeling, even going so far as condoning the possibility of Germany re-entering the 
Pacific, when he replied that the ‘Mother Country must not be embarrassed by 
claims made by her children. The present war was not commenced by Britain for 
plunder, and if it is thought advisable… to return to Germany any of her colonies, 
it is not for us to stand in the way.’69 Most were less tolerant of the Germans 
however. Although James Robert Kirk, a barrister and ex-mayor of Gisborne, 
believed the ‘question must be looked at from the Imperial as opposed to the 
parochial aspect’, he also had the security of the Dominion in mind as he thought 
‘[i]t is essential that no such mistake as was made when Samoa was transferred to 
Germany be repeated.’70 Most respondents expressed similar feelings to Kirk and 
appeared certain that whatever happened they would not tolerate a German colony 
so close to New Zealand’s borders.  
A lack of confidence in New Zealand’s ability to govern others was expressed 
by Dunedin businessman, runholder, and benefactor J. A. Johnstone who did ‘not 
think that the young countries comprised in the British Dominions have attained 
the knowledge and experience essential to the successful administration of outside 
territories.’ He also shared the widely held belief, heard every time annexation 
debates occurred, that New Zealand was better off looking after itself first. He 
wrote that ‘All our abilities and energies are required for the successful 
development of the land we live in.’71 In contrast, Johnstone’s Invercargill partner 
at Wright, Stephenson, and Co., W. D. Hunt, voiced a relatively rare concern for 
the prosperity of the colonies themselves. Hunt professed that when ‘considering 
who is to administer the various colonial possessions taken from the enemy, the 
object to be aimed at is the welfare of the territory to be administered.’72 
                                                 
69
 Cohen, An Empire Symposium, p.9. 
70
 Ibid., p.15. 
71
 Ibid., p.13.  
72
 Ibid., p.12. 
31 
 
Trading incentives entered the equation for some. W.B. Scandrett, representing 
Southland Pioneers, could admit that retaining the former German colonies would 
benefit the British Empire. He responded, ‘I see no advantage to New Zealand to 
take over the government of Samoa’ except for ‘the fiscal benefit that would or 
might accrue to our traders by reason of our productions entering that island free 
of duty if it formed a part of the Dominion of New Zealand.’73 The Otago and 
Southland bias of the survey needs to be taken into account for the lack of 
agitation on the trade issue. A survey of representative Auckland men, where 
Pacific trading firms were more prevalent, could have resulted in a different 
picture. However, the wide-spectrum of responses elicited from Cohen’s 
questionnaire are representative of the kinds of attitudes that would continue to be 
expressed in the following five years as New Zealand’s future role in Samoa 
continued to be a point of contention.  
In contrast to the ‘representative’ attitudes just canvassed, the Labour movement 
took a less equivocal position. Their policy of ‘no annexations’ cannot be 
overlooked, especially as the movement had, by this stage, begun to command 
considerable support among New Zealand’s working classes, and others, due to 
their anti-War position. The Maoriland Worker, edited by Harry Holland, 
reiterated Labour’s internationalist line of ‘no annexations and no indemnities’ 
and supported the international socialist policy of ‘the frank abandonment of 
every form of Imperialism’, ‘leaving to each people the freedom to settle its own 
destiny’. The editorial called pro-annexation politicians ‘shallow’ and was 
worried that their protestations supported by ‘the Jingo Press of the Empire’ might 
hold up peace negotiations.
74
  
Holland’s stance in the Maoriland Worker was further expanded upon in a 
pamphlet titled Samoa: a story that teems with tragedy, which presented Samoa’s 
post-contact history as a tragic tale of imperial injustice where Samoans were used 
‘like pawns in a game played by trading gamblers’ backed up by their respective 
Governments.
75
 The pamphlet was an anti-capitalist polemic, clearly inspired by 
Hobson’s and Lenin’s critiques of capitalist imperialism. Holland believed New 
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Zealand ‘capitalists’ viewed Samoa as ‘a field for exploitation’,  and argued that 
the future of Samoa had been distorted by those capable of viewing the issue only 
‘from the narrow vantage ground of an ignoble class interest.’76 He argued not 
only that New Zealand should not receive control of Samoa, but that no other 
imperial-minded, militaristic, and exploitative nation or groups of nations should 
assume power either. His pamphlet was released before the creation of the League 
of Nations, so it dealt with the question of annexation rather than the Mandates 
system. But in the immediate post-War years, Holland’s position on the League of 
Nations was clear. Alongside Peter Fraser, Holland would damn the League of 
Nations as a ‘mere continuation of the wartime alliance of capitalist states; not a 
true league of peoples’.77 Holland’s commitment to self-determination was also 
reflected in his commentary on India and Ireland, and in all these cases he drew 
inspiration from the wider international socialist and Labour movements. 
Although New Zealand’s earlier imperial discourse remained unaffected by the 
socialist anti-imperialism of the nineteenth-century, the rise of the New Zealand 
Labour Party (NZLP) with its socialist agenda would mean that from this point 
onwards, imperial criticism took on a much sharper form.   
That said, the influence of Labour’s stance must not be over-emphasised. As 
with the 1883 debates, the main concern was to keep foreign powers out of the 
region. The Evening Post summed up the nation’s, if not Massey’s, mood in the 
lead up to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 by commenting ‘New Zealand was 
not concerned to extend her own boundaries, nor even those of the British Empire, 
but to exclude a robber and a pirate Power from recovering its foothold in these 
peaceful seas… .’78 This is why the Mandate system met wider approval in New 
Zealand rather than pure annexation. It was only the New Zealand Herald that 
consistently rallied for the annexation of Samoa. Through its editorials the paper 
attempted to mobilise the public on this issue, even calling on the mayors of every 
municipality to agitate for its cause.
79
    
                                                 
76
Holland, Samoa, pp.3, 18.  
77
 Gerald Chaudron, New Zealand in the League of Nations: the beginnings of an independent 
foreign policy, 1919-1939 (North Carolina & London: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2012), p.48; 
H. E. Holland, NZPD, 1921, Vol. 190, p.196. 
78
 ‘The Compromise’, Evening Post, 4 Feb. 1919, p.6. 
79
 ‘The Retention of Samoa’, New Zealand Herald, 7 Feb. 1918, p.4. 
33 
 
The rhetoric of the New Zealand Herald editorials matched the behaviour of 
Prime Minister Massey and Ward at the Paris Peace Conference. There appeared 
to be a disjunction between the ambitions of the pair and the more humble 
aspirations of everyday New Zealanders. The Auckland Star reported how they 
did ‘not believe that in their [Massey, Ward and the Australian Prime Minister 
‘Billy’ Hughes] eagerness for annexations they represent popular feeling in their 
own countries. Certainly there is no enthusiasm in New Zealand for the 
attachment of Samoa to this country.’ The newspaper was particularly scathing of 
Hughes’ self-interested ‘table-banging’ which in their opinion did ‘not conform 
with the new spirit of the times, and are not consistent with the ideals with which 
and for which the British Empire has been fighting.’80 The Evening Post 
acknowledged the ‘great energy, not to say precocity’ with which New Zealand 
and Australia’s leaders were showing at the Conference in trying to push their 
claims but asked ‘Has New Zealand the faintest idea of the responsibilities in 
which she would be involved if she were really to be taken at her word and given 
charge of Samoa as a small nation?’ The editorial concluded that ‘[t]he burden of 
Samoa would be an intolerable one to New Zealand if she took it by annexation 
and on the footing of individual control and responsibility.’81 It ended on an 
optimistic chord, remarking that ‘administration under the League of Nations 
would be so much easier a task’. As future events would show, this view was 
mistaken as New Zealand’s Samoan administration came under fire in the late-
1920s and early 1930s.    
Finally, it cannot be forgotten that the Peace Conference also dealt with the 
future of Nauru, a Pacific territory that New Zealand was equally, if not even 
more interested in ‘acquiring’ than Samoa on account of its phosphate deposits.82 
However, even on this question a minority of commentators were not blinded by 
the benefits a share in the territory would bring to the farming industry and New 
Zealand’s economy. Despite its rural constituency, the Wairarapa Daily Times 
complained that ‘Massey seems bent upon placing as many millstones round New 
Zealand’s neck as possible.’ The newspaper foresaw the ‘nightmare’ Samoa could 
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be, let alone ‘having another island foisted on to us… because there happens to be 
a few pounds of phosphates there.’83 Other critics argued that the eventual 
agreement between Britain, Australia and New Zealand went against the spirit of 
the League of Nations. For instance, the Auckland Star observed how ‘[s]ome 
critics of the agreement, of which this paper has been one, contend that such a 
monopoly is contrary to the spirit of the League, and that all members of the 
League should have access to the island’s wealth.’84 Resource-rich islands were 
there to be exploited; the only apparent concern was that the resources were 
exploited fairly amongst the developed nations of the Western world. In all their 
self-confident, enlightened, posturing, the nations involved in the Paris Peace 
Conference felt it unnecessary to consult the wishes of Pacific Islanders when 
deciding their futures. This culture of ‘we know best’ was pervasive. Although 
some observers remained unconvinced about the benefits that a joint 
administration would bring to the Dominion, very few took the well-being of the 
indigenous population into consideration. A similar lack of concern was shown 
when Tokelau was annexed to New Zealand in 1926, and administered by the 
Samoan Administration, in a geo-political move that allowed the Samoan regime 
to banish chiefs further away from their home islands. That no concern was 
expressed over the deleterious effects of mining on the people of Nauru and 
Banaba demonstrates the marginality of the anti-imperial idea at this point.  
*** 
This chapter has canvassed the wide-range of attitudes that Pākehā New 
Zealanders possessed when it came to Pacific Island annexation. In doing so it has 
shown that even before formal colonial administration had begun, Pākehā New 
Zealanders—notwithstanding the consistent pro-annexation line of the New 
Zealand Herald—were generally wary of undertaking too great of a ‘burden’ in 
the Pacific. Once formal administration began, many of these concerns proved to 
have been prescient. Although none of the more paranoid statements about being 
swamped by ‘inferior races’ ever eventuated, other concerns over the burdens of 
administering Pacific peoples were realised.
85
  The few commentators who 
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queried whether New Zealand had the required experience to govern others saw 
their concerns validated as under-qualified New Zealand administrators would go 
on to make copious blunders in the interwar period.  Faced with challenges from 
indigenous resistance movements, paternalistic New Zealanders were forced to re-
assess their beliefs. Some were willing to admit that Pacific Islanders could decide 
for themselves what was in their best interests, while others hung tight to the 
sentiment expressed at the League of Nations: the idea that these people were not 
yet ready to stand on their own two feet.      
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Chapter Two 
Mischievous Elements: 
Metropolitan Criticism  
of ‘New Zealand’s Pacific’  
between the Wars  
 
‘The spectre of race war and ‘clashing tides of colour’  
haunted the privileged world of whites between the wars.’1 
In 1920s New Zealand, many people—both Māori and Pākehā—still looked 
upon the fact they lived in a ‘white man’s country’ with utmost pride.2 The 
Evening Post lauded the fact that the 1926 census revealed that 95% of the 
population were, ‘broadly speaking’, white (the definition of ‘whiteness’ for the 
purposes of the census included Pākehā and Māori). Yet concern was voiced over 
the remaining 5%—the proportion of the country labelled ‘race-aliens’; that is, the 
real ‘coloured’ population of the country. Of these, the ‘great majority’ were 
‘Asiatics’ (5147), while ‘Fijians and other Polynesians’ counted for a mere 697.3 
Although the proportion of ‘race-aliens’ was minimal, their presence was enough 
to cast a shadow over ‘white New Zealand’. At the same time, it is arguable that 
New Zealand’s Pacific Empire, with its diverse, ‘coloured’ populations, cast an 
even bigger shadow over the nation. Even though analogies between colonialism 
and Africa and the Pacific are problematic, Barbara Bush’s description of the 
interwar colonial condition introduced above provides a useful starting point for 
this discussion. Simply put, the post-War inauguration of New Zealand’s Pacific 
Empire brought the ‘spectre of race war’ closer to home. Increased colonial 
entanglements with non-white populations raised the possibility of increased 
racial violence. The two issues troubled white New Zealanders. The presence of 
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‘race-aliens’ both within and adjacent to New Zealand’s domestic borders sparked 
fears that the ‘clashing tides of colour’ could erupt at any moment.  
This chapter is concerned with three different case studies that illustrate the 
tensions between races in the interwar period. The debates over indentured labour 
in Samoa, New Zealand’s involvement in suppressing Indian unrest in Fiji, and 
New Zealand’s attempts at dealing with Samoan anticolonialism, all referenced 
this concept of an impending ‘race war’. Whether it was an imagined ‘invasion’ of 
Asiatic hordes from Samoa, or a perceived threat to white prestige on account of 
growing ‘race consciousness’ in Samoa and Fiji, events in New Zealand’s colonial 
sphere haunted the metropolitan mentality. New Zealand’s Pacific Empire brought 
white New Zealanders into closer contact with Pacific Islanders, Chinese and 
Indians; just how they dealt with these new relationships is reflected in what side 
of the imperial debate observers sided. In contrast to the Government, colonial 
officials and its supporters, I argue that the critic did not abide by the ‘white 
versus black’ false dichotomy, and took a more critical view of the behaviour of 
his or her own race for inciting dissatisfaction in the first place. Tony Ballantyne 
has written that ‘the cultural entanglements of empire… made questions of ethnic 
origins and the boundaries between peoples urgent’.4 While the Government and 
Colonial Administrations did their best to maintain the ‘rule of colonial 
difference’, domestic critics tended to view Pacific Islanders as fellow citizens 
who deserved the same rights as Pākehā and Māori. In the interwar era public 
figures like Harry Holland believed that the colonised populations of the Pacific 
were capable of governing themselves according to their own needs; the old belief 
that the ‘white race’ had a divine right to govern ‘inferior’ races began to be 
challenged. 
A critical difference between the interwar period and previous eras is that 
criticism suddenly ‘mattered’. New Zealand was administering Samoa as a 
‘sacred trust’ on behalf of both the British Empire and the League of Nations. 
Therefore when it came to New Zealand’s Samoan administration at least, the 
Government was held to account by the PMC charged with making sure the 
Mandated power was administering the territory ‘to the utmost the material and 
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moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the Territory’.5 The 
Evening Post’s London correspondent would write in 1927 that ‘…the world, as 
through a telescope, watches Samoa from Geneva… Experts, practising 
politicians, ordinary intelligent people, take a serious and growing interest in the 
mandated territories.’6 Given this added international scrutiny, the Government 
was in no mood to be embarrassed by what were routinely labelled unpatriotic, 
mischievous elements.  
The Government still possessed the ability to suppress dissent in both Samoa 
and its domestic sphere. Even in New Zealand—a renowned liberal democracy—
to openly criticise the Government was a fraught exercise. Jared Davidson has 
written that during the Great War, ‘New Zealand was one of the most stringent 
suppressors of dissent in the western world.’7 War regulations were used to 
suppress ‘anything deemed critical of the New Zealand government, the war 
effort, and conscription.’8 Official attitudes remained similarly draconian 
throughout the interwar period also. The War Regulations Act (1914) had turned 
into the War Regulations Continuance Act (1920) which preserved many of the 
previous regulations regarding sedition.
9
 Importantly, successive conservative 
Governments took advantage of these regulations to control the dissemination of 
information regarding their Pacific territories.  Conservative sections of the 
nation’s press argued for the need to maintain non-partisan equanimity on matters 
of colonial policy, yet for critics on the Left especially—who recoiled at the 
prospect of acquiring imperial possessions in the first place—the possibility of 
adopting such an ambivalent attitude was inconceivable.
10
 
Left-wing critics advocated for a free press, arguing that it was especially 
important on colonial and imperial matters. In a speech against the Government’s 
action in Fiji in 1920, Holland cried: ‘There was nothing more dangerous to our 
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common civilisation than the exercise of the press censorship.’11 He was certain 
more would have been made of the expedition by the public if only there was not 
such a paucity of information available regarding colonial events throughout the 
Empire. Holland argued that the public were oblivious to what was occurring in 
India so when confronted with something like the Fijian affair they were not able 
to place the events in the context of wider Indian disillusionment with British rule 
and a growing sense of global ‘race consciousness’ amongst colonised 
populations. It was Holland’s sincere wish that ‘Some day the people of this 
country and of Australia, and of every part of the British Empire would insist on 
their right to know everything taking place in every part of the world.’12 Critics 
who knew the full extent of colonial maladministration could not remain silent. 
They felt it was their duty, not only to the people that New Zealand was 
administering, but to the reputation of the young nation itself, to hold the 
Government’s colonial record to account.  
‘Beneath the New Zealand Flag’: criticism of New 
Zealand’s policy of indentured labour.  
Labour practices in the Pacific provided one of the earliest triggers for critical 
engagement by New Zealand observers. Chinese indentured labour in Samoa 
became the first real issue of public contention in the interwar period. While at the 
same time, controversy erupted over the decision to send a warship to Fiji in 
response to Indian industrial action. In both these cases, the ‘cultural 
entanglements of empire’ were thrown into stark relief as New Zealand was 
drawn into wider colonial problems in ‘its Pacific’. Unease over these new 
arrangements was particularly reflected in the arguments that emerged over 
indentured labour as organisations from all corners of New Zealand society 
debated the topic. As with earlier imperial debates, criticism was split between the 
humanitarian and the parochial. To some, the issue hinged over whether or not 
New Zealand could morally continue a system of bonded immigrant plantation 
labour, while to others, the predominant concern was the presence of a Chinese 
population in a New Zealand territory. This section shows that critics opposed the 
policy for widely contrasting reasons. 
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The differing rationale for opposition was reflected by the range of critics the 
issue attracted. The Methodist minister, Arthur Liversedge criticised the ‘moral 
indifference’ displayed by his own Church for not taking a stronger stand on the 
issue. He regretted that the ‘task of arousing the country to the gravity of the 
issues... was left to a discredited Labour Party, the feeble Theosophists, a few 
consistent advocates of a White New Zealand policy, and the splendid women of 
the W.C.T.U.’13 The following section aims to capture the mood of domestic 
criticism by elaborating on the positions taken by the organisations he identified 
and some of those he omitted from his list such as secular women’s groups. The 
range of critics identified by Liversedge demonstrates how this was an issue that 
went beyond traditional Labour interests and became a key talking point in wider 
society. The issue came to dominate debates surrounding New Zealand’s 
acceptance of the Mandate for Samoa in 1919 and remained in the public sphere 
until the policy was revoked in 1923. The Christchurch Press commented that out 
of all the problems which the Samoan Mandate presented, ‘none is so grave as the 
problem of indentured labour.’14  
The literature on indentured labour both globally and in the Pacific is vast and 
well developed.
15
 Historians have argued that after the abolition of slavery, 
indentured labour emerged as the next best system for guaranteeing cheap labour 
for capitalist developers.
16
 Even though it was not technically slavery, the system 
originated from the same foundation, and it shared many of its disagreeable 
qualities. Moreover, the system operating in Samoa was comparable to the one 
abolished by the British in Fiji in January 1920.
17
 Extensive humanitarian 
campaigning by British missionaries Charles Freer Andrews and W. W. Pearson 
contributed to the Fijian decision.
18
 The revelations regarding conditions in Fiji by 
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Andrews and Pearson, as well as the ones made in earlier decades by New 
Zealand migrant and Methodist missionary, John Wear Burton, meant that 
indentured labour was widely touted as virtual slavery.
19
 In the face of accusations 
by the Labour contingent in 1919, Massey was willing to admit that ‘indentured 
labour may be slavery under some flags’, however he would defiantly claim that 
‘it is never slavery under the British flag.’20 With Massey’s pronouncement, New 
Zealand formally accepted the Mandate for Samoa in October 1919, and his 
Government agreed to continue operating the system of indentured Chinese labour 
that the German administration had developed in 1903.
21
   
The Government’s decision was not taken lightly. Massey was doubtlessly 
aware the move ran contrary to the tide of official British opinion as systems of 
indentured labour were being dismantled across the Empire. The decision also 
came close to transgressing article three of the Mandate which stipulated the 
prohibition of the slave trade and forced labour (‘except for essential public works 
and services, and then only for adequate remuneration’).22 Even if the 
Government could justify that their system was both essential and adequately 
remunerated, it was harder to argue that indentured labour was in the spirit of the 
League of Nations. Yet faced with the prospect of failing to live up to promises 
that the Samoan Mandate would not become a financial liability, the Government 
felt they had no other alternative but to announce that ‘coloured labour’ was 
necessary.
23
  
As well as being driven by the desire to obtain cheap labour, this need for 
‘coloured labour’ was also influenced by nineteenth-century scientific and 
medical orthodoxy which dictated that the copra plantations could not be worked 
by white men given the inability of the ‘white race’ to survive in tropical 
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climates.
24
 Racial stereotypes were also employed when it was said that the 
Samoans could not be relied upon to fill the void because they—presumably as 
‘lazy natives’— simply could not be compelled to work.25 The radical option of 
leaving the land ‘unworked’, as proposed by Sir Apirana Ngata, was ridiculed.26 
The New Zealand Government urgently needed labour to restrict the spread of the 
introduced rhinoceros beetle; it was deemed irresponsible to allow the plantations 
to return ‘back to nature’.27 Apart from the Labour contingent, only Ngata 
objected to indentured labour in the House of Representatives. He asked 
caustically, ‘Which is to be the chief policy at Samoa, a good balance-sheet 
continually increasing, or the happiness of the Samoans?’28 Massey and his 
colleagues did not believe one had to come at the expense of the other, rather they 
felt both could be achieved. This self-confidence was illustrated in Allen’s remark 
that ‘there is no country that has a fuller knowledge of the Polynesian race, and is 
more able to take this responsibility, than New Zealand.’29  
For the Labour movement, led on this issue by Holland, indentured labour was 
an attack on the dignity of the worker, and was labelled as slavery ‘in all but 
name’.30 By focusing on the exploitation of Chinese labourers, Holland found 
himself standing on more familiar Labour ground than when he argued against 
annexation in 1918. Bernard Porter has argued that in Britain, the Labour MPs 
critical of the Boer war and South African colonialism ‘enthusiastically seized on 
its implications vis-à-vis the exploitation of labour’ to a greater degree than 
attacking the iniquity of colonialism as a whole.
31
 Holland was able to draw on a 
long tradition of fighting the exploitation of the working classes by the capitalist 
                                                 
24
 Holland would point out that the White Australia policy showed that white labourers could work 
in tropical Queensland without difficulty. For the creation of racial science in the nineteenth-
century see Warwick Anderson, The Cultivation of Whiteness: science, health and racial destiny 
in Australia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002), pp.73-86. And for altered Australian 
perspectives in 1920 see Russell McGregor, ‘Drawing the Local Colour Line’, JPH, Vol. 47, no. 3, 
2012, pp.236-7.   
25
 Even if the Samoans were employed, the Government would have encountered a labour force 
shortage due to the destructiveness of the 1918 influenza epidemic. Perhaps in an attempt to 
deflect attention from New Zealand’s role in exacerbating the death toll, this argument was not 
employed as frequently as racial arguments. P. S. O’Connor, ‘The Problem of Indentured Labour 
in Samoa Under the Military Administration’, Political Science, Vol. 20, no. 10, 1968, p.22. 
26
 Sir Apirana Ngata, NZPD, Vol. 185, 1919, p.523. 
27
 Sir James Allen, NZPD, Vol. 185, 1919, p.508. 
28
 Ngata, NZPD, Vol. 185, 1919, p.523. 
29
 Allen, NZPD, Vol. 185, 1919, p.505.  
30
 H. E. Holland, Indentured Labour: is it slavery? (Greymouth, 1920), p.1.  
31
 Porter, Critics of Empire, p.134.  
43 
 
class, and received widespread support throughout the growing Labour 
movement. His pamphlet, Indentured Labour: is it slavery? outlined the hypocrisy 
of the Reform Government by continuing a system that had been proven 
untenable in British colonies in South Africa, New Guinea, Fiji and Queensland. 
Holland drew on his first-hand investigations in Samoa as a member of the 1920 
Parliamentary Delegation to the Pacific Islands. While in Samoa Holland not only 
discovered that the conditions of the system left much to be desired, but that the 
Samoans were resolutely against the continued immigration of the Chinese men. 
He referred to an interview with a young Samoan engineer who told him the 
Samoans were perfectly willing to work, only they were not prepared to lose their 
dignity by accepting the pitiful wages on offer.
32
 Holland was not alone in his 
stance, the Napier Branch of the NZLP sent a letter of protest to Massey citing the 
detrimental effects of the system on all involved, while the Labour newspaper, the 
Wellington Citizen, believed indentured labour was ‘slavery’ and therefore 
‘beneath the New Zealand flag’.33  
As far as Labour was concerned, race did not factor as much as concerns 
regarding the immorality and injustice of the system. Drawing on the work of G. 
R. Warburton, Jacqueline Leckie has noted that Labour ‘by no means shared 
common views on non-white immigration or exhibited the blanket racism so often 
attributed to the working class.’34 Holland, for example, believed in the socialist 
concept of ‘international brotherhood’ which Leckie has noted was a widely held 
idea before the Great War.
35
 Speaking to a Social Democratic Party meeting at 
Alexandra on the topic of the Indian strike in Fiji, Holland said ‘it does not mean 
anything to me that the workers happen to have black skins. Their interests are 
identical with the white workers in New Zealand.’ Holland believed a better 
response to the Indian strike would have been for New Zealand ‘to point out to the 
Government of Fiji that the way out of the difficulty was economic justice – 
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decent living conditions and proper remuneration – such remuneration as white 
workers would demand.’36 The NZLP felt indentured labour or the exploitation of 
workers in general, was not a necessary or inevitable evil even though the Reform 
Government portrayed it in those terms. Holland’s colleague Peter Fraser believed 
indentured labour went ‘against the spirit of New Zealand liberty’.37 For Labour, 
New Zealand liberty was a right that should extend throughout all its territories 
and to all its inhabitants, regardless of ethnicity.  
Not every critic of the system shared Labour’s commitment to internationalism. 
Many were explicitly xenophobic and showed scant regard for the well-being of 
the Chinese labourers. For instance, the Returned Services' Association (RSA) did 
not oppose the policy because of its resemblance to slavery; on the contrary, they 
were determinedly anti-Chinese, and worried that the Chinese presence in a 
territory administered by New Zealand might encourage further migration. One 
member of the Wellington RSA conveyed the level of concern with the remark, 
‘If they got one ounce of Asiatic labour into New Zealand then it was a case of 
“Good Night, Nurse!”38 At a 1921 annual conference the RSA agreed ‘they 
should be absolutely unrelenting in their hostility to allowing any Asiatics into the 
country.’ It was common to come across theories arguing that ‘race-mixing’ 
would result in an inferior breed.
39
 The ‘mingling’ of Samoans and Chinese 
concerned the organisation, one member said ‘before long this mongrel breed 
would be desiring the rights of New Zealand citizenship.’40 An Auckland Star 
editorial also begged the question: ‘Will all the coloured inhabitants [meaning in 
this case both Samoan and Chinese]… eventually rank as citizens of New 
Zealand, and will they be free to settle here?’41  
Citizenship under the Mandate system was a vexed issue. Article two of the 
Mandate gave New Zealand ‘full power of administration and legislation’ over 
Samoa ‘as an integral portion of the Dominion of New Zealand, and may apply 
the laws of the Dominion of New Zealand to the Territory, subject to such local 
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modifications as circumstances may require.’42 Despite appearing comprehensive, 
this stipulation did not grant New Zealand sovereign control over Samoa. James 
C. Hales made an important study of the sovereignty question in 1937, where he 
reasoned that: 
Whereas in a colony the Sovereign is accountable to no one, in a 
Mandated territory the Mandatory merely has the right to exercise the 
powers of sovereignty; therefore the territory is not owned by, and its 
inhabitants are not Nationals of, the Mandatory.
43
  
His conclusion came out of a series of resolutions made by the PMC in 1923.
44
 
Here it was decided that ‘status of the native inhabitants of a Mandated territory is 
distinct from that of the nationals of the Mandatory Power’, and, like a 
Protectorate, they ‘are not invested with the nationality of the Mandatory 
Power…’.45 This ruling implies New Zealand’s xenophobes had no need to be so 
concerned.  
Yet these pronouncements were not made until 1923; the answer to the 
citizenship question was still open-ended in 1919 and 1920 when these debates 
were occurring. It needs to be remembered that the League of Nations and the 
PMC were novel bodies attempting novel experiments in diplomacy. All that 
people could draw on was an imprecise statement about treating Samoa ‘as an 
integral portion of the Dominion’. Given the precedent set by previous colonial 
arrangements, like the Cook Islands and Niue, where the indigenous inhabitants 
became nationals of the metropolitan power, individuals assumed the same 
arrangement applied for Samoa. Nor is it any surprise then that the old concerns 
about being ‘swamped’ in their own country by ‘inferior races’ re-emerged. In 
this instance however, since the Samoans were closely related to Māori (a people 
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the Pākehā respected), and had not yet shown much resistance to New Zealand 
rule, they were not as castigated as the Chinese.
46
 
Anti-Chinese racism was particularly rife in New Zealand in the 1920s and the 
debate over indentured labour cannot be separated from this context. After 
decades of trying to perfect policies to prevent Chinese immigration, the 
Immigration Restriction Amendment Act was passed in 1920. Because the Act 
‘gave the Government complete control over who could immigrate to New 
Zealand’, Nigel Murphy has identified it as the moment where the ‘White New 
Zealand’ policy was officially inaugurated.47 Barbara Brookes has examined anti-
Chinese attitudes held by both Māori and Pākehā by looking at the controversy 
that erupted when Māori women were discovered working on Chinese market-
gardens in the late-1920s.
48
 According to Brookes, this affair strengthened the 
shared definition of ‘whiteness’ between Māori and Pākehā as both ethnicities 
excluded ‘Asiatics’ from their version of the nation.49  Leading Māori politicians, 
like Ngata, promoted hostility towards Chinese immigrants, and after hearing 
allegations of miscegenation between Māori women and Chinese gardeners, 
Ngata put his weight behind the 1929 Committee of Inquiry set up to investigate 
the matter. Supported by the men of Te Akarana Maori Association, Ngata sought 
to preserve the purity of Māori women and guard against a creation of a ‘hybrid 
race’. Brookes writes that ‘[i]n seeking to promote ‘race consciousness’, Apirana 
Ngata upheld a view of white New Zealand that encompassed Maori, but 
excluded the Chinese and the Indian.’50 Ten years earlier, Ngata was similarly on 
guard against ‘race pollution’. During the Parliamentary debate centring on 
indentured labour he compared the ‘Indians and Chinamen’ to ‘refuse’.51 It 
appears that it took the existence of another racial ‘other’ to mend some of the 
differences between elite Māori and Pākehā; extending the boundaries of the 
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tropical Empire to include Samoa threatened their shared vision of ‘White New 
Zealand’.  
If New Zealand’s Labour movement had few doubts about the immorality of 
indentured labour, the Dominion’s major Protestant denominations were less 
certain. Traditionally seen as the moral conscience of society, the three major 
Protestant churches allowed the issue to pass without taking a definitive stance.
52
 
Out of the three, it was the Methodist Church who displayed the most concern. 
The question caused ruptures within the Methodist Church as individual loyalties 
were torn between the New Zealand Government, the indigenous population, the 
immigrant labourers and God above. Although the New Zealand Methodist 
Church held no mandate for Samoan missionary work, in 1919 they were hoping 
to secure the responsibility for both Samoa and Tonga as well as their eventual 
missionary responsibilities in the Solomon Islands.
53
 Hence in November 1919 
the missionary secretary had been corresponding with Allen in an attempt to 
gather as much information on the system as possible.
54
 At the same time, the 
Wellington synod came to their own conclusion, sending a request to Massey ‘that 
the system be at once brought to an end.’55 Allen replied comprehensively to both 
Methodist correspondents.  His argument was the same as already expressed in 
Parliament: ‘the Samoans themselves will not work’, it was a case of either ‘back 
to nature, or progress’, and the ‘latter is only possible by securing labour from 
outside.’ If labour was not imported Allen believed ‘Samoa would be worthless to 
New Zealand, to the Empire or to the League of Nations.’ Allen assured his 
correspondents that under the ‘conditions and safeguards imposed’ there would 
not be ‘any reason to be alarmed’.56 
Outwardly, the Church promised to give ‘serious consideration’ to the matter at 
their annual conference in March 1920.
57
 However, inwardly, Allen’s reply 
appeared to have settled the matter. The conference’s resolution, drafted by the 
Rev. A. B. Chappell, virtually echoed Allen’s argument. It contended that the 
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system of indentured labour itself was not inherently evil, only some its 
manifestations were, and these could be mitigated under best practice.
58
 In other 
words, the Church endorsed the Government’s policy. Attached to the forwarded 
Conference resolution to Massey was a request that gifts made to the Church’s 
Foreign Mission Fund would not be ‘subject to a penalty to which other charitable 
and religious gifts are not subject.’59 It is possible to speculate that this request 
and the Conference’s decision were in some way linked. Nor should Chappell’s 
influence be discounted. Eight years later, the conservative minister and 
newspaper columnists authored a pamphlet that although claiming to be ‘an 
independent review’ was heavily weighted towards the side of the Samoan 
Administration in the midst of the Samoan controversy.
60
  
A handful of individual Methodists publically distanced themselves from their 
Church’s phlegmatic pronouncement. For several months after the conference, the 
Methodist Times received a series of letters criticising the resolution. Outspoken 
Hawera minister, Liversedge, was the most persistent of these. He argued the 
Church’s tacit endorsement of indentured labour—an issue he believed was 
‘perhaps the most important political question ever submitted to this country’—
was a poor reflection on a supposedly Christian New Zealand.
61
 Liversedge 
believed the system was ‘anti-Christian’ as it went against the ‘sanctity of 
personality’; labourers became ‘Indispensable as a productive machine’ but held 
no value as individuals.
62
 Another correspondent noted the Labour Party’s 
uncompromising opposition was more Christian than the Church’s. He or she 
believed the Conference resolution ‘adroitly side-stepped the principle involved, 
seeking merely to improve the conditions of what is essentially an evil thing’ and 
condemned the system from a ‘Christian and humanitarian standpoint.63 
Liversedge was eventually convinced to change his tune in August 1922 after 
being told that the London Missionary Society (LMS) and Methodist missions in 
Samoa believed that imported labour was necessary for the well-being of the 
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territory, ‘Natives and Europeans alike’, while they were also of the opinion that 
the Chinese presented ‘no real moral menace’ to the Samoans.64 This is 
symptomatic of a wider pattern where the home Church deferred to the judgement 
of the colonial missions.  
In contrast to the Methodist Church, the other two major Protestant 
denominations offered little in the way of (recorded) public debate on the matter. 
The Presbyterian press, in what was perhaps a reflection of their limited ties to 
Samoa, only touched upon the issue once. This, however, involved publishing the 
Labour Party’s condemnatory official report of their visit to Samoa which, if 
taken as an endorsement of Labour’s stance, was consistent with the Presbyterian 
tradition of opposing indentured labour and the practice of ‘blackbirding’ in the 
New Hebrides.
65
 Meanwhile the Anglican Church’s silence on the issue was more 
conspicuous given the ties between the Anglican Church and the LMS who 
dominated missionary activity in Samoa.
66
 Granted, the Anglican Church had less 
of a conscious social and political agenda than the Methodist Church, and New 
Zealand Anglicans had no direct missionary jurisdiction over Samoa, but this 
silence is typical if later attitudes on Samoan problems are to be taken into 
account. In all probability, their silence on indentured labour reflected their desire 
to follow the Government line. It needs to be appreciated that missions were in 
highly contingent positions, the last thing they desired was a situation where their 
home Church jeopardised their relationship with the Administration they were 
reliant upon. The same logic explained why New Zealand Presbyterians were 
critical of French colonialism in the New Hebrides but dared not speak ill of 
British rule in the Condominium.  
Non-denominational Christian organisations such as the Christchurch Council of 
Churches and the Auckland Minister’s Association spoke with more moral 
authority, however. Both organisations wished to see the system discontinued 
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immediately.
67
 Meanwhile, the ‘splendid women’ of the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WCTU) came out in force on the issue in the latter half of 
1920. Their protests were widely published in the press,
68
 while branches from 
Invercargill in the south through to Ponsonby in the north sent letters urging the 
Government to rethink their position.
69
 The letters were uniform in tone: 
indentured labour was ‘a form of slavery’ that was ‘degrading and demoralising to 
the natives of Samoa’ and ‘should not be permitted in any country or dependency 
under British rule’.70 The WCTU’s concern for the wellbeing of indigenous 
Samoans did not appear to extend to the Chinese labourers. The Ponsonby branch 
cried ‘“Down with Slavery and Race pollution!”’ They believed the system, and 
mainly the ‘threat’ of miscegenation, would lead to ‘much degradation to a proud, 
intelligent and moral people’. 71 Although the branch was not explicit over who 
they were referring to, the adjectives were typical of the language employed to 
describe the Samoans by sympathisers, but seldom heard when the characteristics 
of the Chinese were described.  
If the Churches fell short of their billing as the ‘conscience of the nation’, New 
Zealand women, another group traditionally characterised in this way, appeared 
willing to fill that void, as secular women’s organisations joined the WCTU in 
protest also. Having already played an important role in the abolishment of 
indentured labour in Fiji, women’s groups were well equipped to mobilise once 
again to oppose the system in Samoa.
72
 The Women Citizens’ Association in 
Dunedin devoted a monthly meeting to the issue in July 1920.
73
 Addressed by the 
pacifist, Millicent Macmillan Brown, the meeting resulted in a resolution to 
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forward a strong protest to the New Zealand Government.
74
 Similar resolutions 
were passed by the National Council of Women and the Auckland Branch of the 
Women’s International League. 75 These protests cast doubt on Jessie Mackay’s 
description of the state of New Zealand women at the end of 1920 as ‘not only 
politically unorganised, but ... not politically alive.’76 Dorothy Page has noted that 
as this death knoll was sounding, ‘change was in the air’, and the outlook for the 
women’s movement looked more optimistic. As evident in the reaction to 
indentured labour and later colonial scandals, I suggest that New Zealand’s 
Pacific colonialism was perhaps a catalyst for the reinvigoration of the New 
Zealand women’s movement.77  
Lastly, while it is not clear who Liversedge had in mind when he referred to the 
‘feeble Theosophists’, there is a strong possibility he was referring to the New 
Zealand India League who were influenced by the work of theosophist and Indian 
self-rule advocate, Annie Besant. Like Holland, the League published a pamphlet 
in 1920 responding to Massey’s claim that indentured labour could not be slavery 
under a British flag. The pamphlet featured an article of Besant’s which outlined 
the depravity of the indentured labour system.
78
 This interest in Fiji by the New 
Zealand India League illustrates that the debate over indentured Chinese labour in 
Samoa was inseparable from the debates over indentured Indian labour in Fiji and 
wider international contexts. It also shows that even though the British Crown 
Colony did not fall under New Zealand’s formal sphere of influence, events and 
news from Fiji were still closely followed. Hence, it is unsurprising that New 
Zealand’s involvement in the Indian strike in Fiji in 1920 drew significant interest 
also.  
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‘No Jurisdiction Whatever? ’ Reactions to the Fijian 
expedition . 
In February 1920, 50 New Zealand military personnel were sent to Fiji on the 
armed warship, the Tutanekai, in response to an urgent call for assistance from the 
Governor of Fiji, Cecil Rodwell. Many in the Labour movement viewed the 
expedition as a cold and calculated strike-breaking mission, a further extension of 
Massey’s anti-labour policies—the re-emergence of ‘Massey’s Cossacks’ last 
seen in 1913. The striking Indian workers had only just been freed from the 
indentured labour system, so left-wing commentators, like Holland, believed the 
New Zealand contingent were sent to keep the former girmitiya in bondage. 
Massey, on the other hand, was adamant the ship was going to Fiji as a 
‘precautionary’ measure. He was of the opinion that the presence of the warship, 
armed with a twelve pound Maxim gun and four-pound Lewis gun, ‘will have a 
very wholesome effect.’79 In the words of Governor General, the Premier thought 
it was necessary to inform the public that the operation was ‘for [the] safety of 
[the] white population.’80 
The differences between the Government’s attitude and that of Holland and the 
Labour movement were stark. Holland queried why New Zealand should interfere 
in the affairs of a Crown Colony at all. He wrote: 
Had Fiji been under New Zealand control the dispatch of an armed force 
to intervene in an industrial dispute would have been sufficient to call 
forth the united protest of the Labour movement. The position becomes 
infinitely worse when an armed force is sent from New Zealand, whether 
to intimidate or coerce, working men and women of another race, enslaved 
and struggling against their enslavement, in an island 1500 miles away 
from us and over which New Zealand has no jurisdiction whatever.
81
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To this Massey replied he was ‘only sorry that a more suitable ship was not 
available’, claiming ‘[i]t is not the Briton’s way to turn his back when his 
neighbour requires assistance’.82 And despite professing his ignorance of Indian 
work arrangements in Fiji, he cited ‘similar trouble’ that had erupted in India 
albeit on a larger scale as justification for his decision.
83
 It is surprising so little 
has been made of the affair in the existing historiography.
84
 New Zealand’s 
response was not only made without hesitation, but came faster than the 
Australians. New Zealand’s foray into Fijian affairs signifies first of all that 
‘greater imperialism’ was still a strong current at least in the upper echelons of 
society, and secondly that ‘New Zealand’s Pacific’ was not limited to its own 
territories, but to the wider ‘Anglo-Saxon Pacific’.85 The critical responses to the 
affair demonstrate a further commitment to stamping out colonial abuses 
throughout the Pacific.  
The veil of secrecy supposedly surrounding the expedition was soon lifted due 
to the circulation of ‘exaggerated rumours’ regarding the ship’s destination.86 
Some were led to believe that the men were heading to Samoa because the 
constabulary force recently sent to the territory had been ‘“wiped out.”’87 Massey 
put these rumours straight, allaying fears of an uprising in New Zealand’s new 
territory. However he could not quell the impression that it was a strike-breaking 
expedition. Holland, in a published letter of protest to the Premier, believed the 
New Zealand armed forces were being sent to deny the Indian workers, who had 
only just been freed from ‘one of the worst forms of slavery known to 
civilisation’, their right to improved work conditions.88  
                                                 
82
 ‘The Fiji Trouble’, misc. newspaper clipping, 5 Feb. 1920, in Minor disturbances – Disturbances 
at Fiji, 16/9/5, N1 471, ANZ. 
83
 This was undoubtedly a reference to the Jallianwala Bagh or Amritsar massacre in April 1919 
where General Reginald Dyer’s British forces killed 379 people and wounded 1200 (Indian 
estimates are much higher), Derek Sayer, ‘British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920’, 
Past & Present, no. 131, 1991, p.131.  
84
 Ken Gillion has written on the 1920 strike, though did not focus on New Zealand’s involvement, 
K. L. Gillion, The Fiji Indians: challenges to European dominance, 1920-1946 (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1977), pp.18-47. 
85
It must also be noted that the military preparations for this mission were sent and signed off by 
Brigadier Major General George Richardson of later Samoan notoriety.  
86
 Liverpool to Rodwell, 2 Feb. 1920, in Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry – Disturbances – 
Fiji, AD1 770, 22/228, ANZ. 
87
 ‘Sensational Rumours’, NZ Times, 3 Feb. 1920, in Tutanekai (ship) – Instructions for carrying 
troops to Fiji in connection with native strike, M1 1081, 17/11/143, ANZ. 
88
 H. E. Holland, ‘Letter to the Premier’, N.Z. Times, 4 Feb. 1920. 
54 
 
Holland’s interpretation gained currency on the Auckland waterside where the 
waterside workers refused to load the ship with coal on 5 February. After deciding 
to go on without the extra coal, the Tutanekai was held up further still—this time 
on account of the firemen who refused to work the stokehold. The firemen were 
arrested for their troubles, however after being persuaded that the goal of the 
expedition was not to break the strike but ‘simply to see that no harm was done to 
the 4000 white men, women and children by the 16,000 dissatisfied coolies’, the 
firemen agreed to return to the ship.
89
 After the event, the President of the 
Auckland Waterside Workers’ Union, distanced himself from the waterside 
action, stating that the men were acting on their own initiative.
90
 
Not everyone was as easily convinced of the expedition’s purpose as the 
Auckland watersiders and firemen. Criticism continued once the ship had left 
New Zealand. The Mt Eden and Edendale Branches of the Labour Party 
forwarded a resolution to Massey expressing their concern over New Zealand’s 
interference in ‘what is practically an industrial dispute between slave-owners and 
slaves and ex-slaves.’91 The General Laborer’s Union seconded this judgement,92 
as did the Wellington North Branch of the Labour Party.
93
 Working women also 
protested. The Wellington Housewives’ Union carried a unanimous motion 
condemning the ‘unconstitutional action of the Government’ in sending armed 
men to Fiji, ‘a British possession over which New Zealand has no jurisdiction 
whatsoever’. 94 The women believed Massey’s action ‘intended to intimidate or 
coerce the workers there into accepting wages, conditions of working, and social 
conditions that are a disgrace to any country calling itself civilised’.95 
Women came to play a further role in the debate as Walsh’s New Zealand 
Magazine claimed the returned servicemen were induced to go on the condition of 
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protecting the white female population. The magazine labelled this ‘a proper Tory 
lie.’96 The ‘gentlemanly’ pretence of evoking the safety of white women was used 
to justify further colonial repression in 1928 when two armed war ships were sent 
to Apia to intimidate the Mau, whose programme of non-violent resistance had 
hamstrung the effective administration of the archipelago.
97
 One of the 
justifications for this measure by the Reform Government was that they had 
received a coded message from Apia that implied white women were in grave 
danger.
98
 Both these instances are illustrations of what Fiona Paisley has termed 
‘race hysteria’, where fears of the racial ‘other’ are suddenly manifest into a kind 
of paranoia over the safety of the most ‘vulnerable’ and the most ‘pure’ symbol of 
white society, white women.
 99
 
There were several ‘affrays’ in Fiji between strikers and white police throughout 
the restive period. Whether or not the New Zealand forces, who had arrived at 
Suva on 12 February, were involved in these is difficult to ascertain. Official 
correspondence conveyed the impression that only local police had been involved 
in the conflict. The Evening Post reported that the ‘New Zealanders were never in 
actual conflict with the strikers’, but mentions that a ‘detachment went with 
Captain Wilkes as far as sixty miles up-river, where the natives and Hindoos were 
amazed by a demonstration of Lewis gun firing.’100 On the other hand, Walsh’s 
New Zealand Magazine, edited by Thomas Walsh, Secretary of the Seamen’s 
Federation, claimed that the New Zealanders were the ones who fired revolver 
shots into an Indian crowd during a confrontation on 14 February where three 
Indians were wounded and one died.
101
 Regardless of the direct involvement in 
colonial violence by the New Zealand expedition, the interpretation of the episode 
by Walsh’s New Zealand Magazine revealed just how far the Labour movement 
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believed Massey and other colonial agents were prepared to go to preserve white 
prestige and maintain the colonial order.  
The magazine ascribed the events in Fiji to a pre-meditated plot on behalf of the 
Fijian colonial Government and the sugar growers who were disgruntled over the 
decision to abolish the indentured labour system.
102
 By creating disaffection 
amongst the Indian workers, the colonial regime would be provided with the 
justification for re-enforcing strict work conditions. Adding to the deceit, the 
magazine argued that the plan had been brewing for six months.  White women 
and children had been arranged to vacate the area in advance and returned 
servicemen had been deliberately recruited as far back as November 1919 
because, in the words of one plantation owner, ‘They are used to murder.’103 The 
New Zealand press had been enlisted ‘to “prepare” the people for this stunt’ by 
publishing images of the ‘Indians in Paradise’, speculating on a potential Indian 
massacre of the white population and publishing statements by the Bishop of 
Melanesia, Dr. Twitchwell, who ‘made a lot of statements proving how nice it 
was for the Indians to slave in Fiji.’  According to the magazine, ‘Every 
arrangement was made for a cool, cold-blooded massacre of the Indians, after the 
example of General Dyer.’104  
As Bush has noted, fears of racial uprisings were widely-held by white 
populations in colonial settings. Soon after the New Zealand force arrived in Fiji, 
Rodwell—who surely had Amritsar in mind—judged the unrest to be more racial 
outbreak than strike.
105
 For their part, Walsh’s Magazine reversed the 
Government’s argument by pointing out that it was in fact the ‘white people’ who 
were ‘menacing the Indians with the threat of starvation’ and ‘forcing them to 
work for sugar growers whose profits defy calculation.’ It was alleged that the 
Sugar Companies were paying for the expedition, and that the New Zealand 
Government were willing to accept their request ‘is enough to sicken every New 
Zealander’. The magazine argued ‘If the Sugar Company can pay for strike-
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breaking, white terrors, and subsidise every anti-labour campaign in Fiji, Australia 
and New Zealand... it can afford to pay its slaves a living wage.’106  
It is clear that the magazine, unlike metropolitan and colonial elites, recognised 
the foundations of the ‘privileged world of whites between the wars’ perhaps 
more closely resembled a house of cards. Like many others on the Left, Walsh’s 
Magazine linked colonialism with exploitative capitalism. As in Samoa, New 
Zealand had important trading interests in Fiji that were predicated on an 
iniquitous colonial order and the continued imposition of unequal labour 
conditions. The Indian revolt brought the threat of ‘race-war’ into focus and this 
section has shown that whereas critics responded by emphasising the 
discrepancies between metropolitan justice and colonial justice, the colonial 
powers did what they could to protect their vested interests and maintain their 
positions of privilege. In several years’ time, critics would once again voice their 
concerns over violations of ‘British justice’, as the colonial order in Samoa found 
itself under threat.        
‘The War on Samoa’: Attitudes towards New 
Zealand’s handling of the Mau 
While concerns over colonialism in the immediate post-War period more 
regularly focused on labour policies, by the mid-to-late-1920s and early-1930s 
criticism became more avowedly anti-imperialist. Following the lead of the 
Samoan anticolonial movement known as the Mau, critics in New Zealand 
questioned the legitimacy of New Zealand’s colonial rule. Despite Porter’s 
generalisation about British Labour seizing on colonial labour injustices at the 
expense of tackling the root of colonial problems, the NZLP took the lead on the 
issue.
107
 They were the only major political party to recognise the Samoan desire 
to reject New Zealand’s paternalistic control.108 The Communist Party of New 
Zealand (CPNZ), who had formed in 1921, also entered the debate—adopting an 
even stricter anti-imperial stand than the Labour Party. A number of writers, 
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intellectuals, clergymen and lawyers joined the two Parties in condemning the 
events in Samoa to varying degrees also. The connections between the Mau and 
New Zealand-based sympathisers will be discussed in the following chapter but 
for now, I will be limiting my focus to criticism emanating from metropolitan 
New Zealand as opposed to its territories. In the process I will recover a spectrum 
of dissenting voices.   
The rise of the Mau was followed with interest by politicians and the press in the 
Dominion from its conception in October 1926. From the first, the movement was 
identified as a threat to New Zealand’s colonial administration. Although the 
Government tried to downplay its significance, labelling it a mere ‘half-caste 
movement’,109 by the end of 1927, the Mau claimed to represent 90% of the 
Samoan population and its strategy of non-violent resistance was seriously 
hindering the operation of the Administration. Growing domestic and 
international criticism meant the Reform Government could no longer pass the 
movement off as inconsequential. A diplomatic mission by Minister of External 
Affairs William Nosworthy and a Royal Commission of Inquiry were notable 
attempts to extinguish the affair, but both only heightened unrest. Less public, but 
no less telling, was the fact that External Affairs were concerned enough about 
their handling of the affair that they were keeping a file of Holland’s criticism 
throughout 1927-28.
110
    
Holland’s controversial pamphlet, The Revolt of the Samoans, was released at 
the start of 1928 and reached a wide audience.
111
 Holland attacked the autocratic 
style of rule adopted by Administrator George Richardson, and cited a long-list of 
Samoan grievances. Primarily referring to the banishment and deprivation of 
chiefly titles, and the deportation without trial of European ‘agitators’ Nelson, A. 
G. Smythe and E. W. Gurr, Holland argued the Richardson Administration had 
not only co-opted and corrupted Samoan custom but had also shown zero regard 
for  the principles of British justice. Reflecting the level of concern over 
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metropolitan criticism (and how little they thought of the Samoan intellect), the 
Government attributed Holland’s polemical stance as a cause of unrest.112     
As the official organ of the Labour Party, the New Zealand Worker supported 
their leader’s stance; Samoan news featured heavily throughout the first three 
months of 1928. The Worker portrayed the Richardson Administration as a 
tyrannical, military dictatorship. Richardson was likened to Mussolini, and Prime 
Minister Gordon Coates and his Minister of External Affairs, William Nosworthy, 
were not far behind.
113
 To be sure, there was hyperbole in much of the Worker’s 
coverage, nonetheless the paper’s main argument was sensitive to the situation on 
the ground as well as portraying the wider mood of anti-imperialism. To the 
Worker, the ‘exalted’ motives of imperialism had been exposed. The Samoans 
were clearly dissatisfied with New Zealand’s rule, and no amount of whitewash 
and censorship could hide this fact.  According to the following editorial, the 
hypocrisy of New Zealand’s rule was all too evident:  
But if the subjugated people ever become so bold as to entertain the 
feeling that their country is their own, and that they should be allowed to 
govern it, imperialism speedily shows the stuff it is made of. The patriots 
who wish to possess their native land become “rebels against constituted 
authority,” “agitators,” “seditionaries,” and “treason-mongers”; floods of 
repressive ordinances are released; soldiers and warships appear upon the 
scene; terrorism is resorted to to put the “disaffected natives” in their 
places. And when the “rebellion is crushed,” what is called “law and 
order” is re-established.114   
For these critics, New Zealand’s Samoan Administration bore no difference to the 
worst imperial regimes of bygone eras. The editorial struck at the essence of the 
colonial order; it reflected the inconsistent binaries of colonial rule that anti-
imperialists the world over hoped to overcome.  
Despite the conservative press’ image of Labour as ‘Labour-Socialists’, 
‘Bolsheviks’, ‘pro-Germans’, and all-round unconstructive critics, there was more 
to the Worker’s commentary than pure opprobrium. The newspaper published 
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Holland’s proposed solutions numerous times. If Labour became the Government, 
Holland made it clear that they would restore the right of a fair trial to the people 
of Samoa in line with British justice, recall the banishment and deportation orders, 
lift the ‘senseless’ muzzling of the free press, meet the Samoans in a conciliatory 
spirit, nationalise the copra industry, and finally, they would appoint an 
Administrator ‘with a full knowledge of Samoan history and an understanding of 
the psychology of the Samoan people.’115 Under a Labour Government, Holland 
was convinced ‘there would be no insurmountable difficulty in administering the 
mandate’.116  
The last statement did not appeal to those who stood to the left of Labour. 
Although the CPNZ shared Holland’s distaste for the oppression of subject 
peoples under imperial rule, they denounced Labour’s proposed remedies as 
imperialistic. For the CPNZ, the question was not how could the Mandate be 
administered more effectively, rather it was how could the Mandate be revoked 
entirely. By 1930 they argued the Labour Party was paying lip service to their 
belief in the right to self-determination of subject peoples. The CPNZ took 
umbrage with Holland’s argument that the Samoans should be ‘given an adequate 
share of their own government.’117 Emphasising the word ‘adequate’, the official 
Party organ, the Red Worker, ridiculed Labour’s anti-imperialist credentials. 
Labour did ‘NOT propose that the Samoans be allowed to decide this matter for 
themselves, and that the stranglehold of New Zealand Capitalists and the Trading 
Companies be withdrawn, or that the Mandate System is a swindle and a mask to 
disguise the predatory aims of Imperialism!’118 The Party’s Samoan stance was 
settled at their inaugural annual conference in 1928. New Zealand represented 
‘junior imperialism’, and its policy was ‘robbery and oppression’, the Party 
recognised the Samoan claim for ‘complete national independence’.119  
The murder of the nominal leader of the Mau, Tupua Tamasese Lealofi III, and 
seven other Samoans on 28 December 1929 (since referred to as Black Saturday) 
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triggered a new wave of criticism within New Zealand. The Red Worker labelled 
it and the subsequent raids on Mau families a ‘war on Samoa’, while Holland 
compared it to the ‘work of the Black and Tans in Ireland.’120 Soljak wrote a 
highly critical letter which was published in the Samoan Guardian.
121
 While 
Finlayson attempted the same, lamenting ‘Sorrow in Samoa! ... Once again we see 
the results of the encroachment of European races upon the territory of a native 
people’ (except the New Zealand Herald chose not to publish it).122 The CPNZ 
urged the working classes to ‘down tools’ on 3 February in protest. ‘A One Day 
Strike on February 3
rd
 will be a clear and unmistakable repudiation by the 
working-class of the war against Samoans,’ the Red Worker reported.123 In 
contrast, the Methodist Church placed the onus of blame for the tragedy on the 
behaviour of the Mau. Rev. G. S. Shinkfield, chairman of the Samoan Methodist 
mission, felt the Mau had ‘overstepped the bounds completely’ on 28 December, 
and forced the police into drastic action.
124
 And finally, the Anglican Church, 
characteristically, remained silent.
125
  
The Protestant response requires some disentangling because, much like Church 
attitudes towards indentured labour, while official policy appeared to depend on 
the attitudes of their respective missions, not everybody within the Church 
followed suit. Rev. Greenwood, Vicar of St. Albans in Auckland, was one of the 
few clergymen who protested against the Government’s response to the Mau. His 
case is comparable to Arthur Liversedge’s vis-à-vis indentured labour. 
Greenwood frequently wrote letters of protest to Prime Minister Ward yet was 
met with no suitable reply.
126
 His stance was influenced by his relationship to 
Tamasese (and his family), which began when the paramount chief was jailed at 
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Mt. Eden prison for six months beginning in December 1928.
127
 Despite this 
connection, Greenwood stressed he had no association with ‘any political or pro-
Samoan party’, but was acting out of Christian compassion.128 Like a prior 
correspondent to the Auckland Star, Greenwood regretted the Church’s ‘profound 
silence’ on the entire affair.  
An examination of the Anglican press corroborates the view that the Church, 
Greenwood excepted, was conspicuously silent on the matter. The Church Gazette 
for the Diocese of Polynesia, despite regularly commenting on Samoan 
developments, made little of the Mau. The Bishop of Polynesia, Rev. 
Kempthorne, made a brief mention to the political situation in November 1928, 
when he commented that he ‘was particularly glad to find that the political life of 
Samoa had improved so markedly although it has not yet returned to normal.’ His 
acknowledgment that ‘respect for law and order’ was ‘[o]ne of the blessings [of] 
British rule’, ‘and any challenge of this is always instinctively reprobated by 
peoples born to that tradition’ made it perfectly clear what side of the debate he 
identified with.
129
 Furthermore, New Zealand-based Anglican newspapers 
avoided engaging with the issue completely. That New Zealand’s Protestant press 
were loath to criticise the Samoan situation can be partly explained by the fact that 
General Richardson was an Anglican, and a regular member of the congregation 
at the ‘Apia “White Church.”’130 Moreover, his enthusiastic developmental 
policies were well received by the European missionary contingent in Samoa.
131
 
The Administrator’s standing is illustrated by the fact that after he was relieved of 
his Samoan post mired in controversy, he continued to be revered in Anglican 
circles. In March 1929, just months after the V.P.B report ‘bombshell’, he was 
invited to address the opening ceremony of the new Melanesian museum at the 
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old Melanesian Mission headquarters in Kohimarama where he praised Anglican 
missionary endeavour in Polynesia and Melanesia, and noted how indebted 
colonial Governments were to them.
132
   
Church opinion was also influenced by a report made by a visiting LMS 
deputation consisting of the Rev. Alexander Hough and Rev. George Parker.
133
 
The pair arrived in Samoa in September 1928 to investigate a rupture in the 
Samoan church caused, at least partially, by the Mau. And while their report did 
not condemn the Mau outright, it nonetheless reinforced some of the well-worn 
stereotypes about the movement; ‘easily aroused’, excitable and irrational 
Samoans had been led astray by opportunist European agitators like Nelson.
134
 
The report also noted how individual missionaries of the Samoan LMS—less 
disinterested than the visiting deputation—‘naturally felt some indignation at the 
treatment which the Administrator latterly received from the Samoans.’135 Most of 
the indignation appeared to come from the Rev. H. Darvill who, the report noted, 
was particularly close to Richardson. Darvill responded hyper-critically to an 
appeal for support from the Nelson-backed New Zealand Samoan Defence League 
distributed to the Bishops and clergy of New Zealand in March 1929. In his 
comprehensive reply, Darvill compared the attempt to gain the favour of the 
Christian community like ‘bringing about an alliance of Christ with Belial.’136 The 
missionary, who had been in Samoa since the early 1920s, refuted the points made 
by the League, and like Hough and Parker, believed the unrest was caused by 
European ‘agitators’.137   
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The Methodist Times’ only contribution to the debate was the assessment by 
Rev. Shinkfield who, like the LMS missionaries, blamed the ‘pernicious influence 
of certain white men.’138 Although the newspaper published Shinkfield’s opinion, 
it decided not to cover the criticism from pioneering missionary to the Solomon 
Islands, and that year’s Conference President, John Francis Goldie in June 1929. 
During an address in Hamilton Goldie called for a ‘clean-slate’ in Samoa. He felt 
the appointment of military men to the administration was a mistake, and called 
the imprisonment of Tamasese a ‘blunder’ because a New Zealand citizen could 
not be imprisoned for a similar offence. Goldie’s interpretation of the League of 
Nations Mandate led him to conclude that the Administration’s powers in Samoa 
could not be any greater than the Government’s powers in New Zealand. 
According to the missionary, a ‘frank confession of error’, coupled with ‘a round-
table conference of the leaders of all parties’, and the cancellation of Nelson’s 
deportation orders was enough to rectify the situation.
139
  
Whether in response to the plea of the New Zealand Samoa Defence League or 
of their own accord, several well-known New Zealand clergy and academics 
organised a petition to the Government calling for an investigation into the whole 
state of Samoan affairs.
140
 Sent in September 1930, it contained the signatures of 
seventy-nine ‘leading clergy of all denominations, University professors in each 
centre in New Zealand, and legal and medical professions and other public men’.  
Amongst the signatories were the pro-Labour and pro-Ireland, Catholic bishop, 
James Michael Liston and Auckland University’s Professor of Law Ronald 
Macmillan Algie, who liked to describe himself as 'a Tory in the old tradition’.141 
Professor J. P. Grossman, who had been dismissed from Auckland University 
College on charges of fraud, was another signatory.
142
 Even allowing for the 
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mixed nature of the signatories, it shows that at least some university intellectuals 
and clergymen took seriously their function as ‘critic and conscience’ of society. 
The petition also demonstrates that the tide of public opinion was changing. 
Colonial criticism was not limited to the anti-imperial Left, but attracted a range 
of figures that may not have identified as anti-imperialists, but could, when 
prompted, realise colonialism’s flaws. The following section will expand on 
aspects of ‘dissident crosscultural collaboration’ that helped expose colonial 
scandals to the New Zealand public.   
 
 
Chapter Three 
‘White and Dark Races’: 
The Convergence of ‘White’  
Dissent and  
Islander Resistance. 
 
‘Revulsion at imperial history should allow a continuing  
interest in the dynamics of empire.’1  
Now that metropolitan dissent has been identified and described, it is necessary 
to understand how those dissenters interacted with the anticolonial movements 
that predominantly originated from within the Pacific Islands out of dissatisfaction 
with New Zealand’s colonial rule. In the case of Samoa and the Cook Islands, 
anticolonial movements made full use of sympathetic individuals and 
organisations in New Zealand to further their causes.  
In this chapter I argue that aggrieved colonial subjects were driven to find allies 
in New Zealand because the channels for genuine dialogue between colonial 
officials and colonial subjects were virtually non-existent. New Zealand’s Island 
administrations did not have the prerequisite administrative capacity to deal with 
democratic participation, let alone proper channels for grievances to be heard and 
dealt with, and nor did they endeavour to create them. The few channels that did 
exist were deliberately crafted so that only a minority of voices would ever be 
heard. In Samoa, the administration only recognised the word of the Fono of 
Faipules while in the Cook Islands, the same situation applied for the Island 
Councils. Both these colonially constructed and wholly artificial bodies consisted 
of officially-appointed members whose opinions were generally taken to be 
authoritative by colonial officials even though their status was often raised to a 
station above that held in indigenous life. Moreover, complaints from other 
quarters of society were routinely and unceremoniously dismissed for failing to 
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represent ‘true native opinion’. Taken alongside heavy censorship and the 
pervasive racist attitudes of officials who refused to believe indigenous citizens 
could articulate grievances on their own accord (and were instead ‘put up to it’ by 
mischievous European elements), this meant that aggrieved Pacific Islanders had 
to find or invent other ways to have their grievances heard. The non-violent 
resistance of the Mau was one such tactic, forming relationships with metropolitan 
sympathisers was another.  
Metropolitan sympathisers possessed the advantage of existing in a society 
without these impediments to expression; they proved to be valuable friends to the 
disaffected in the colonies. As shall be seen, this is illustrated in the Samoan case 
by Nelson and the Mau, and in the Cook Islands by Albert Henry and the Cook 
Islands Progressive Association (CIPA). Shut out, or not fitting into the 
sanctioned colonial public sphere, these movements turned to the metropole for 
redress. In New Zealand they were received sympathetically not by mainstream 
organisations, but by similarly marginalised, counter-cultural, activist movements. 
In the case of the Mau, Nelson attracted a range of figures, either from the 
political Left or with ties to Samoa; while the CIPA found support in the 
Communist-dominated Auckland Trades Council. By placing these movements 
side by side, this chapter is interested in exploring the anticolonial ‘dynamics of 
empire’. Just as the official side of the imperial divide concocted complex 
networks to facilitate colonial rule, so too did the non-official side figure out ways 
to obstruct or circumvent this rule. These two case studies illustrate that colonial 
grievances quickly turned into genuine anticolonial movements through 
heightened interaction, and friendship, between the metropolitan centre and the 
colonial periphery.    
This idea, of an interwoven relationship between indigenous and metropolitan 
dissenters, differs slightly from postcolonial theorists in that it posits the two sides 
on an equal and complementary footing.  In Culture and Imperialism Edward Said 
downplayed the significance of metropolitan anti-imperialism to anticolonial 
struggles. In the same vein as C. L. R. James and other colonial nationalist 
scholars, Said observed that anticolonialism only emerged in the metropolitan 
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centres after colonised nationalists took the lead in the colonies.
2
  Although Said 
acknowledged the tradition of anti-imperialism in European intellectual circles 
since the mid-eighteenth century, he contended that ‘there was no overall 
condemnation of imperialism until… after native uprisings were too far gone to 
be ignored or defeated.’3 In certain respects this statement holds for New Zealand 
and its Pacific Empire. It could be argued that it was only after Black Saturday 
that metropolitan criticism intensified. But if anything, the earlier chapters of this 
thesis have revealed that condemnation of imperialism was not necessarily 
predicated on the presence of indigenous anticolonialism. Much metropolitan 
critical discourse was inspired by ideological considerations somewhat divorced 
from the practical realities of the colony. This chapter furthers the discussion by 
arguing that the two often operated in concert.  
Whether Said’s formulation holds for the New Zealand context or not, the idea 
is not without merit and the motivation behind his argument forms the basis of 
this chapter. The blatant Euro-centricity of the assumption that metropolitan 
imperial criticism somehow overrode indigenous anticolonialism in importance is 
both obvious and unhistorical. Euro-centric interpretations were what Said was 
reacting against, and this is why I now turn to the dynamics that existed between 
the colonial and metropolitan dissenters. It is clear that metropolitan dissent and 
colonial resistance were not at opposite ends of the spectrum; they were working 
together, and therefore need to be studied in the same frame. It should not be a 
case of privileging one over the other, but foregrounding and exploring the 
connections that existed.  
Metropolitan ‘mischief-makers’ were a difficult proposition for the New 
Zealand Government at the best of times. Their involvement in colonial politics, 
and more specifically the prospect of them leading the ‘child-like’, ‘simple-
minded’ Polynesian astray made colonial officials anxious. That the Samoans and 
Cook Islands Māori were aware the New Zealand Māori were accorded almost the 
same rights as Pākehā was damaging enough to the very foundations of the 
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coloniser-colonised relationship.
4
 Yet the creation of colonial ties between New 
Zealand and its Pacific territories meant the colonial populations were connected 
to New Zealand’s domestic sphere, and despite every effort made by the 
paternalistic colonial regimes to shelter their subjects, the mixing of goods, ideas 
and people between core and periphery was inevitable. In a particularly heated 
moment during a meeting between the CIPA and the Government to discuss Cook 
Island dissatisfaction in 1946, CIPA member G. Hartnell interrupted 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Arthur Osborne, who had just refused to accept a 
CIPA representation in Rarotonga on the grounds that they, domiciled in New 
Zealand, were not real Cook Islanders. Hartnell replied: ‘But these boys are Cook 
Islanders. They are constantly going backwards and forwards.’5 It is this 
‘backwards and forwards’ mobility of colonial subjects and ideas that the New 
Zealand officials sought to limit and repress, and I aim to highlight.  
While Government and colonial officials stuck rigidly to restrictive distinctions 
and borders, dissenters were not as encumbered. Critics regularly reminded 
policy-makers that the Cook Islands fell within New Zealand’s national borders. 
R. A. K. Mason, in his critical potted history, Frontier Forsaken, believed New 
Zealand was guilty of sending the Cook Islanders into a ‘poverty of the worst sort 
– right within the borders of our own country.’6 Critics employed an inclusive 
structure to emphasise the commonality of metropolitan and colonial populations, 
while officials did their best to employ distancing tactics, devised to exacerbate 
the ‘otherness’ of their Island subjects and entrench their position as colonial 
elites. Although neither the Mau nor the CIPA immediately achieved their 
nationalist goals, their agitation in this period exposed the frailty of white rule and 
laid the basis for later progress towards self-determination.    
The New Zealand Mau 
Facilitated in no small part by Ta’isi Nelson’s considerable personal fortune, the 
Mau created an international network of sympathetic support for their anticolonial 
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struggle. Although Nelson’s networks spanned the globe, the strongest and most 
obvious links were forged within New Zealand where he spent most of his time 
during his five year exile beginning in January 1928 after being controversially 
deported for his role in the Mau, by this point declared a seditious organisation. 
He was deported by the Richardson administration as a precaution against further 
anticolonial agitation, yet in New Zealand Nelson was able to enlist the support of 
friends and allies to advocate on the Mau’s behalf. In many respects, Nelson was 
able to inflict more damage to the credibility of the New Zealand regime from 
Auckland than in Apia. From his home in the wealthy Auckland suburb of Parnell 
or in his offices on Queen St, Nelson took full advantage of his metropolitan 
surroundings to continue his campaign both individually and through the auspices 
of the New Zealand Samoa Defence League. As Peter Hempenstall and Noel 
Rutherford have contended, the ‘mau had effectively shifted its battleground from 
the islands to the metropole.’7 While in exile, Nelson’s ability to gather 
widespread support for the Mau encouraged the Samoans to keep the struggle 
alive; at the same time, his ability to influence metropolitan opinion put the New 
Zealand Government’s colonial policy to the test. This section aims to both 
explore the extent of Nelson and the Mau’s New Zealand network, and reveal how 
those who made up this network attempted to navigate or negotiate their way 
through a top-heavy colonial system.      
The Defence League, and its corresponding newspaper, the New Zealand Samoa 
Guardian, became Nelson’s primary vehicles for publicising the Samoan struggle 
in New Zealand. Ostensibly launched in February 1929 as a response to the 
imprisonment of Tamasese, the Defence League’s inaugural meeting at the 
Auckland Town Hall was reportedly attended by over 1200 people.
8
  Made up of 
Samoans resident in New Zealand and Pākehā and Māori sympathisers, the 
League professed to be ‘non-political’ and desired to ‘avoid all party politics’.9 In 
fact, they did not purport to be ‘actuated’ by any motive other ‘than a sincere 
desire to maintain the prestige of New Zealand while securing for the Samoan 
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people a satisfactory settlement of all their grievances along the lines of British 
justice.’10 The League feigned impartiality, claiming that although they had been 
in ‘close touch with the Government and the representatives of the Samoan 
people’ they ‘in no way’ claimed to ‘act on behalf of one or the other.’ 
Complementing this non-partisan appearance was the decision to make Auckland 
barrister, Alfred Hall Skelton, President of the organisation.
11
 
Despite their claim to non-partisanship, the Defence League was closely 
affiliated to the Mau. Nelson may have wanted to avoid the impression that he 
was the orchestrator of this movement, but his imprint was indelible.
12
 Just as he 
stressed the indigenous aspect of the Mau in Samoa, he emphasised the 
metropolitan flavour of the movement in New Zealand. However, his attempts to 
divorce himself from the League were not always convincing. In a late-1929 
interview with the visiting Rhodes fellow, Margery Perham, Nelson claimed he 
had nothing to do with the newly set-up organisation.
13
 When Perham asked 
whether he might have some copies of their literature for her to look at, Nelson 
went as far as saying he knew nothing about the organisation. Thinking his clerk 
was in on the act, Nelson then asked whether he, ‘rather a stupid-looking man’ in 
Perham’s words, would be able to help her out by tracking some of it down. To 
this the clerk responded ‘It’s all in your cupboard, sir’ and opened the door to 
reveal a cupboard full of League material.
14
  
Nelson was fully cognisant of the light in which he was cast by the New Zealand 
Government and Samoan Administration. He was the ‘troublesome half-caste’; 
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‘the cause of all the trouble’.15 His name had been smeared in the 1927 Report of 
the Royal Commission, and he had been denied a hearing at Geneva in 1928 as 
the representative of the Mau.
16
  It is not surprising that for the Defence League to 
have any chance of success it was assumed that it needed to publically 
disassociate itself from him. The model was effective. Samoan representatives 
were invited to speak to receptive metropolitan audiences; by June 1929, Hall-
Skelton claimed the ‘League had addressed over fifty meetings and tens of 
thousands of citizens, with only one opponent – a “drunk” at the Remuera 
meeting!’17  
Nelson’s New Zealand network also demonstrated its utility when it came to 
lodging Samoan grievances at the League of Nations. Samoans had long favoured 
the petition as a form of protest— Susan Pedersen has pointed out the mediums 
‘nice affinity with Samoan deliberative practices’—and the Mau had 
enthusiastically adopted it as a strategy, albeit with limited success.
18
 While it was 
hopeless to try and launch a petition from within the Mandated territory because it 
first had to meet the approval of the Administrator, there were brighter prospects 
for petitions that originated from outside the territory. However, like New 
Zealand’s internal colonial structures, the PMC was not designed in a manner that 
favoured dissent. It was at the chairman of the PMC’s discretion whether or not 
petitions from outside the Mandated territory were accepted. One of the criteria 
for a favourable hearing was the ‘authority or disinterestedness of their authors’.19 
The originator of the petition mattered; impartiality and reputability were crucial. 
Pedersen has described the contrast between the courtesy delivered to the ‘well-
connected humanitarians of the Anti-Slavery Society’ by the PMC and the 
indifference shown when the petitioners happened to be Samoan.
20
 Here is where 
Nelson’s exile benefited the Mau. From his New Zealand base Nelson was able to 
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either directly organise, or inspire through his public campaign, a range of 
petitions from parties who could claim both authority and neutrality.
21
 I will now 
focus on the petition of the WILPF as it is the most illustrative of both the cross-
cultural nature of the struggle and the Government’s obfuscating response.  
After being prompted by the international head office of the WILPF in Geneva, 
the Auckland WILPF, under the direction of Soljak and Emily Gibson, organised 
their own petition to the League of Nations on behalf of Samoan women in 
1930.
22
  Suitably outraged at Allen’s portrayal of the women’s Mau as a group of 
‘many old women and all known prostitutes’, the Auckland Branch of the WILPF 
offered to represent the Samoans on the international stage.
23
 Contrary to Allen’s 
derogatory appraisal, the WILPF asserted that the women were ‘highly educated, 
cultured, and refined’; it was revealed that one was educated in San Francisco and 
the other at St. Cuthbert’s College in Auckland. The women in question were 
Nelson’s wife, Rosabel Edith Moors, and sister-in-law, Priscilla Muench 
(daughters of the trader H. J. Moors), who had taken up the Mau fight on behalf of 
their male partners who had been forced into hiding. In the words of the women’s 
Mau they felt that ‘After watching with silent grief and tears for many years the 
persecution, gaoling and demeaning of our people we now feel that the Women’s 
International League will help get us Peace and Freedom some day.’24 However, 
as the correspondence attached to the petition reveals, the WILPF were always 
going to be on the back-foot on account of the unequal power relations between 
the Government and the people. The Government was able to tap into wider 
societal conservatism and racism to extinguish the claims of the women. 
Administrator Allen’s deprecating assessment of the women’s Mau was 
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complemented further by the pejorative appraisal of their New Zealand lawyer, 
Thomas Slipper.  
Slipper’s case shows that sympathisers were prepared to physically cross the 
colonial divide; that is, he became a metropolitan figure who advocated for the 
colonised in the colonial periphery. His story reveals that ‘whiteness’ alone could 
not spare an individual from colonial repression. Men or women who either 
crossed the colour line or became a critic of the Administration became 
susceptible to the same treatment as the colonised. He had been in Samoa since 
April 1926 as lawyer to Nelson and the Mau. Because of this, he was always 
treated with suspicion. Prior to the investigation of the Royal Commission, 
Administrator Richardson had asked External Affairs for advice on how to deport 
the young lawyer who, in Richardson’s eyes, was ‘a bad influence among the 
Natives particularly at the present stage.’25 Richardson was ultimately advised not 
to take any action until after the Commission had concluded their investigation, 
however in the meantime incriminating evidence was collected by the 
Administration to bolster their case against the man.
26
 Unflattering affidavits were 
sent to New Zealand to indicate the reprehensibility of Slipper’s character. Harry 
Irwin, an Apia police constable, described his appearance at a picnic where he had 
arrived uninvited and ‘under the influence of drink. … He was dirty and had 
stains on his trousers as if he had messed himself. He was unshaved and looked 
like a vagrant.’27 What was worse however is that he spent his time in the 
company of half-castes and ‘other bad elements.’ Slipper was accused of not 
upholding the dignity of the white race. However, what was reprehensible in 
colonial Samoa, was a little less unforgivable in New Zealand society. The 
Solicitor-General Arthur Fair commented that his behaviour ‘does not seem very 
harmful… although very reprehensible, cannot do any wide spread harm.’ He 
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noted ‘It is difficult to believe that the Samoans are unaware of the existence and 
habits of Europeans who drink heavily and are of idle and dissolute habits.’28   
The final straw for the Administration came in February 1930 when Slipper, on 
behalf of the women’s Mau, charged Allen’s Administration with ‘death and 
bloodshed’ and ‘terrorisation of the women and children’ of the Mau.29 In the 
middle of the ‘war on Samoa’, Allen expressed his belief that:  
‘[a]n offence of this nature is far more serious when committed by a white 
man in a native community, and on behalf of natives, than it might be 
under other circumstances. It is clear also that the publication was very 
widespread, and that the letter was written for the actual purpose of 
spreading mischievous and untrue statements through the country.’30 
Slipper was charged with libel and sentenced to three months imprisonment 
alongside a fine of £105. The Samoan women pleaded to the Administrator to 
have the sentence imposed on them rather than their lawyer, though Allen 
responded by revoking Slipper’s license to practice law in the islands. This meant 
the women had to proceed their case without counsel; it was decided not to delay 
their hearing until a replacement lawyer could be found. The women’s appeal to 
the WILPF was a direct result of this unfair hearing.   
Nelson, in regular contact with his wife and the rest of the Mau, found a 
replacement in the form of Patrick Fitzherbert. Treated with initial suspicion by 
the Administration he was nonetheless allowed to set up practice in Apia in the 
same offices as Slipper. Nelson sent Fitzherbert with instructions not to appear as 
if he had any involvement with the Mau. Nelson wrote to the Mau to let them 
know ‘it is no good to call him the lawyer of the Mau, but just that he is a lawyer 
who has gone to see whether there is any opportunity for legal work.’31 
Fitzherbert’s façade did not last long. Like Slipper, his fraternising with the 
‘loose’ women did not endear him to the Administration. Casting aspersions on 
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the morals of both Muench and Fitzherbert in one go, Allen wrote in reply to the 
women’s petition that Muench spent ‘at least one night till 5 a.m. in the bedroom 
of Mr. Fitzherbert’. Allen described how Fitzherbert ‘received her clothed in his 
pyjamas and carried her into his room – though of course I do not suggest they 
met for any political reason.’32 Tales of raucous drinking and inappropriate 
behaviour were also tabled against him, the more serious of which concerned the 
sexual abuse of his Samoan domestic servants.
33
 Noticeable in the action of the 
colonial administration is the contrast between their treatment of critics compared 
to the treatment of their own. The desperate claims of the women’s Mau were 
dismissed on account of the supposed sexual indiscretion of their adherents and 
the character of their lawyers Fitzherbert and Slipper, yet they were willing to go 
to enormous lengths to cover up the sexual scandals of colonial administrative 
staff, Bigg-Wither and Foster.
34
  
Nelson and the Mau also created links with Māori in New Zealand where their 
shared Polynesian identity was stressed. Most notable in Nelson’s case was his 
friendship with Reform Cabinet Minister, Sir Maui Pomare. Patricia O’Brien has 
recovered the significance of this relationship which began in mid-1919, but 
solidified once Nelson was in exile where the Nelson family visited the Pomares 
in Lower Hutt and Waitara.
35
  The pair had originally bonded over Polynesian 
culture and history, but it was the deteriorating political situation in Samoa from 
the rise of the Mau onwards that dominated their correspondence.
36
 Behind closed 
doors, Pomare, and Ngata (once he returned to the Government benches in 1928), 
tried to convince their leaders to adopt a more conciliatory policy; Pomare even 
turned on his own Government in Parliament during a forceful speech in 1927 
over the deportation of Nelson.
37
 Yet neither Pomare nor Ngata were able to alter 
policy from within Cabinet. Holland, who also remained in close contact with 
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Nelson and Pomare on Samoan matters, would later comment to Nelson, if 
‘Pomare had been prepared to walk out of the Coates Cabinet and say what he is 
now saying, there might have been a different story to tell relating to Samoa.’38 
Out of Parliament, the Mau also found an ally in the Te Akarana Maori 
Association. In 1933, the Mau leader Mata'afa Faumuina Fiame Mulinu'u I 
expressed his condolences to the Association for the death of the Māori King, Te 
Rata Mahuta, while also thanking them for their ‘kindly interest’ shown in the 
struggles of the Samoan people. Again, the ethnic ties between Māori and the 
Samoans was stressed, Faumuina hoped ‘the day is not far distant when the trials 
of Samoa and Aotearoa will pass away, and we all realise our common racial 
origin by closer relationship tending towards welfare and advancement of all 
Polynesian peoples.’39 
The final connection between the Mau and the metropole worth exploring is a 
relationship less important for its impact on the Samoan colonialism but notable 
for the implications it would have for the Cook Islands anticolonial struggle a 
decade and a half later. More by accident than design, Nelson became acquainted 
with the young poet, R. A. K. Mason, due to Mason’s job as a Latin tutor for 
Nelson’s daughter Olive in 1930. Little is known about the pair’s relationship but 
Mason’s biographer, Rachel Barrowman, has speculated that Mason was working 
for Nelson in other capacities as well.
40
 At Nelson’s suggestion, Mason, in his 
mid-twenties, embarked on the first holiday of his life to Samoa in 1930-31. 
While there Mason boasted about spending his time ‘consorting with the heads of 
the “rebel” natives, going to half-caste parties, yarning for long with old traders 
and whites who had gone half-native’.41 And though he observed that the mood 
was ‘jolly’, Mason also noticed the people were ‘very bitter against New Zealand 
(But then, for one reason or other, most people here are – white, castes, and 
Samoan)’.42 Mason’s experience, like Slipper and Fitzherbert, was a further 
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illustration of the porous nature of colonial boundaries. As well as bringing the 
colonised to the metropole, anticolonialism brought metropolitan citizens to the 
colonies. Although limited in its extent, this flow fostered enduring cross-cultural 
ties that exposed the fallibility of the colonialism’s artificial distinctions.   
Nelson’s patronage enabled another side of Samoa to be seen. This was a side of 
Samoa that the Administration and New Zealand Government had tried their best 
to obfuscate. Whether through print media, public demonstration or by funding 
trips to Samoa like Mason’s, Nelson brought the Samoan colonial struggle into 
the purview of ordinary New Zealanders. To those that the issue resonated with, 
like Mason, it made a lasting impact. For Mason, his impressions of New Zealand 
colonial rule emerged again when a similar unrest erupted over the Cook Islands.   
The Auckland Cook Islands Progressive Association  
Little was made of New Zealand’s colonialism in the Cook Islands during the 
unrest in Samoa. For most Cook Islands Māori, the 1920s were a prosperous 
decade (Dick Scott termed it the ‘flowering twenties’); Western material comforts 
were a welcome novelty, and under the considerate rule of Hugh F. Ayson, Island 
affairs proceeded relatively smoothly.
43
 Samoan critics occasionally viewed the 
Cook Islands administration with envy, deeming it the ‘polar opposite’ of their 
own wasteful, militaristic and rampantly crony version.
44
 By the 1940s however, 
the relaxed atmosphere came to an abrupt halt; wartime poverty afflicted the 
territory and the arrival of the United States armed forces had shaken up the status 
quo. Ayson had been replaced as Resident Commissioner by the unpopular 
William Tailby, and dissatisfaction with New Zealand’s colonial rule had awoken. 
It was on Aitutaki— where the Americans were based—that the anticolonial 
CIPA developed in 1943. The movement spread quickly into Rarotonga, and by 
tapping into popular discontent over grievances such as discriminatory wage rates 
and lack of democratic representation, Scott has written that the CIPA ‘laid the 
basis for Maori self-government.’45 As in Samoa, gaining meaningful redress was 
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a difficult proposition; petitions sent to the colonial administration and New 
Zealand Government generally fell on deaf ears. In Henry’s words, ‘Our people 
felt that their grievances were not reaching the right sources.’46 Tailby’s inaction 
over allegations of labour abuses involving Cook Island labourers on the French 
phosphate island of Makatea provided the catalyst for wider agitation.
47
 
According to Scott, ‘[t]o break official silence, the CIPA turned for help to a 
group of Islanders living in Auckland.’48 The subsequent activity of these 
Auckland Cook Islanders (led by Albert Henry) from June 1945 to June 1948 
forms the basis of this section.  
Reminiscent of Nelson’s campaign in the 1920s and 30s, Henry led the Cook 
Islands anticolonial agitation from New Zealand. He had been living in New 
Zealand (voluntarily) since 1943 after previously fashioning a reputation as a 
‘troublemaker’ on Aitutaki.49 In 1945 he was based in Auckland as a bus company 
employee and the secretary of the Brown’s Bay branch of the Labour Party. As a 
well-known figure in the Auckland Cook Islands community, he was an obvious 
port of call for the disaffected CIPA delegation. Even though Mason was to 
describe the Makatea affair ‘the worst labour scandal in New Zealand history’, 
Henry struggled to find a receptive audience amongst mainstream organisations in 
Auckland (his own Labour Party included).
50
 On the recommendation of Te Puea 
Herangi, Henry turned to the secretary of the Auckland General Labourers’ 
Union, Pat Potter, who had been appointed a Māori liaison officer for the 
Communist controlled Auckland Trades Council due to the support he gave to 
Ngati Whatua during the Orakei Marae stand-off in 1943.
51
 Realising the 
seriousness of the situation, Potter promptly publicised the affair in the trade 
union journal Challenge (edited by Mason).
52
 As a stark illustration of the 
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differences between official and non-official lines of communication, it was said 
that Peter Fraser’s Government received notice of the affair via the journal before 
it had received a report from Tailby.
53
 In addition to publicising the scandal, 
Potter advised Henry to set up an Auckland Branch of the CIPA in October 1945 
to receive grievances and agitate on behalf of those resident in the Cook Islands. 
Like the New Zealand Samoa Defence League, a Pākehā, Thomas Goode, was 
elected president, while Henry took on the less prominent role of secretary. The 
organisation also had the official aim of looking after the welfare of Auckland 
Cook Islanders, but under Henry’s direction—not to mention the influence of the 
Auckland Communists—the anticolonial intentions of the organisation became 
apparent.
54
 
CIPA anticolonial networks were multi-directional. As the metropolitan 
representative for the aggrieved parties in the Cook Islands, Henry received 
petitions to be forwarded to the New Zealand Government on their behalf.
55
 
Henry told the Government his Auckland organisation did not feel any personal 
discontent towards the Administration, it was those in the Cook Islands who were 
unhappy; his role was merely to facilitate Cook Island grievances. A statement 
sent to him from a Rarotongan Island Councillor said the ‘people have been docile 
too long under the domination of the white man’. Henry said it was his role to 
break the ‘barrier’ of discontent.56   Yet despite what Henry told Wellington, 
information flowed in the opposite direction as well. Working with Pat Potter and 
the Auckland Trades Council introduced the Cook Islanders to new methods of 
protest. Henry was in constant contact with the CIPA branches in the Cook 
Islands, and encouraged the Rarotongan watersiders to take industrial action to 
improve work and pay conditions.
57
 Physical mobility between New Zealand and 
the Cook Islands was a prominent aspect of the agitation also. Henry and Goode 
went on a ten week tour in October-December 1946 where the pair received long 
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lists of grievances from the different islands and communities. By February 1947, 
the Cook Islands branches of the CIPA confirmed that Henry was their accredited 
spokesman in Auckland and called upon him to convince Fraser of the legitimacy 
of the CIPA as the organisation of the Cook Islands people.
58
   
Even though the metropolitan-colonial network was advantageous in some 
respects, it also proved an impediment to gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the 
Fraser Government. Similar to the way Nelson was dismissed as a troublesome 
half-caste, the fact that Henry was agitating from Auckland (not the Cook Islands) 
proved an impediment to the establishment of dialogue between officials and 
aggrieved Islanders. Fraser insisted that representations from the CIPA in the 
Cook Islands had to conform to ‘constitutional practice’; that is, they had to come 
through the Resident Commissioner.
59
 Fraser’s Parliamentary under-secretary 
Arthur Osborne, who was designated the task of mediating with the CIPA, made it 
clear that the Government could not recognise the organisation, given that it was 
based in Auckland, as representative of the people in the Cook Islands.
60
 In the 
view of the Government, recognition of Henry and the Auckland CIPA would be 
‘an insult to the Arikis and to the people of the Island Councils as at present 
constituted.’61 Given that the members of the Island Councils were appointed by 
the Administration, the Government’s sentiment appears less convincing. Tom 
Davis noted how Cook Islanders believed the Island Councils had ‘become 
merely puppets in the hands of that official [the Resident Commissioner] and have 
never represented the true voice of the people.’62 Like the Mau, the CIPA 
increasingly began to carry the weight of popular opinion yet Wellington held 
stead-fast to their conception of traditional authority and failed to notice the 
changing tide of indigenous feeling.
63
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The Government also had a problem with the leadership of the Auckland CIPA. 
The fact that Goode was Pākehā failed to lend to the credibility of the organisation 
in the Government’s eyes. Osborne quipped, “How long have you lived there, Mr 
Goode?” to the President, in an attempt to discredit his standing. Henry’s history 
also raised eyebrows. The tone of correspondence between the Government and 
the Auckland CIPA became noticeably sharper after Island Territories received a 
character reference from the Resident Commissioner describing Henry’s history 
as a  ‘local agitator, trouble maker,[and] rumour aspires to lead Cook Islands 
people in New Zealand and represent Group in Parliament.’64  
The CIPA’s decision to side with the militant Auckland unions was, however, 
the main factor determining how they were perceived by the Government. 
Fraser’s Government was ‘growing increasingly hawkish and anti-communist in 
the early days of the Cold War’, and as Roth and Scott both argued, for these three 
turbulent years, the Cook Island’s anticolonial struggle was inseparable from New 
Zealand’s internal cold war politics.65 By siding with the Communists, the CIPA, 
in Auckland and the Cook Islands, was tarnished with the same brush. The 
anticolonial aims of the CIPA were not too far removed from Fraser’s own views. 
After all, this was the man who two decades earlier denounced New Zealand’s 
colonialism in Samoa alongside Holland. Fraser was willing to accept the CIPA 
but first they had to break their ties with the Communist unions. Or as Roth put it, 
Fraser was more fixated with ‘curbing the Communists’.66 Representatives of the 
Government sponsored Federation of Labour were sent to the Cook Islands to 
investigate the situation in June 1946, and came back reporting that the CIPA, as 
‘little friends of the Soviet Republic’ and ‘self-styled Communists’, had 
‘arrogated to themselves the right to speak for everybody in the Islands.’67  
Henry and the CIPA made non-militant relationships as well. Te Puea and 
Waikato Māori remained important allies. Just as shared Polynesian ancestry 
caused Māori to identify with the Samoan struggle, the shared whakapapa of 
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Tainui and Aitutaki Māori fostered a natural affinity between the groups. Te Puea 
had long been aware of problems on Aitutaki and she had received a direct appeal 
for help from an individual Aitutakian CIPA activist.
68
 At the CIPA’s request, she 
visited the Cook Islands in June 1947. Fraser and Tailby were insistent that she 
obtain ‘a balanced view of Cook Islands affairs’ so her movements were tightly 
choreographed. Nonetheless, she managed to enjoy an umukai hosted by the CIPA 
where she was invited to lay the foundation stone for the CIPA museum. Free 
from Tailby Te Puea received information that would inform a critical report 
destined for Fraser’s office.69  In this instance, Waikato Māori, Cook Islands 
Māori, and Auckland militants converged. Each group fell outside of mainstream 
New Zealand, but were not content to remain marginalised.  
On a further visit to the Cook Islands in July-September 1947, Henry brought 
Dr. Edwin Burton Gunson with him. Gunson was the brother of Sir James Gunson 
the conservative former mayor of Auckland and was a renowned physician and 
patron of the arts in his own right.
70
 Like Nelson and Pomare, the pair had struck 
up a friendship over a mutual interest in Polynesian history. As far as the Resident 
Commissioner was concerned, Gunson was visiting Rarotonga to verify certain 
Māori traditions for a proposed book on the history of the Māori.71 Yet in 
Rarotonga he was overheard participating in a late night meeting of CIPA 
members. According to an eavesdropping police officer, Gunson was ‘disgusted’ 
by the Government’s decision to establish a counter union to the CIPA, which left 
the policeman with the distinct impression that Gunson was conspiring with 
Henry.
72
 This anecdote reveals that in these highly charged colonial settings, 
every cross-cultural bond between dissidents was perceived in political terms.   
The relationship between Mason and Henry was of a similar nature. Through 
Potter, Mason was put into close touch with Henry and the pair quickly bonded 
over an interest in colonial history. Potter, Mason and Henry had shared a car 
together during their journey from Auckland to Wellington and back to meet the 
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Prime Minister in June 1946 where Mason soaked up information from Henry to 
write his ‘history and general survey’ of the Cook Islands published in January 
1947 (the first general history of the Cook Islands). Mason’s summary of the 
situation is apposite, he observed that the Cook Islanders:  
… were not only aroused by the general upsurge of downtrodden peoples 
the world over, but they had an organisation spreading rapidly, both in the 
Islands and in New Zealand. They had direct contact with Maori and 
European friends, staunch and tested allies, they had means of maintaining 
pressure and publicity.
73
 
Yet the limits to ‘dissident crosscultural collaboration’ were shown when Henry 
decided to sever his ties with the militant unions and side with Fraser’s 
Government.
74
 The CIPA changed its focus to economic rather than political 
improvement, believing it to be a more important or realistic goal than self-
determination at that time. To Mason’s disappointment, the CIPA transformed 
into an ill-fated, co-operative movement in 1948.
75
 This move reflected the 
changing attitude towards colonial problems by the metropolitan State; it was not 
so much the aims of the CIPA that caused the problem as it was the company the 
movement kept. At the same time, Henry’s separation suggests that ‘dissident 
crosscultural collaboration’ in the New Zealand context was a uniquely interwar 
phenomenon arising on account of the intersection between progressive Left 
politics, anticolonial nationalism, and conservative Government policy. Under the 
more enlightened colonial model encouraged by the United Nations, the need for 
dissident collaboration collapsed. It was no longer necessary to have dissident 
collaboration when the Government could offer conciliatory collaboration.      
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Conclusion  
I wouldn’t give N.Z. (Britain either, for that matter) charge of a shit-house.1 
Just how typical was the type of sentiment expressed by Mason above? It is a 
question worth exploring further because however tempting it is to classify 
Mason’s blunt appraisal of New Zealand’s imperial credentials as characteristic of 
‘the New Zealand critic of Empire’, this thesis has shown that there was really no 
such thing as a ‘typical’ colonial critic. Indeed, one of the aims of this thesis has 
been to stress the range and diversity of critical responses to ‘New Zealand’s 
Pacific’. Although Mason’s attitudes were shared by many on the Left, there were 
others—especially pre-War commentators—whose criticism was not a 
demonstration of their wider dissatisfaction with the modern ‘nation’ or, for that 
matter, ‘Western civilisation’. So rather than conclude with a portrait of the 
‘typical’ colonial critic, it is more useful to reflect upon some of the 
characteristics that ‘typified’ imperial and colonial dissent in New Zealand at 
different times.  
This thesis has looked at metropolitan dissent in two main contexts: the debates 
around Pacific annexation and the debates over New Zealand’s colonial record. 
Each context resulted in a distinctive kind of criticism. As shown in the first 
chapter, in the context of debates around annexation, criticism was very rarely 
actuated by a concern for the indigenous populations of the Islands. Opposition in 
these periods was more frequently characterised by parochial self-interest. 
Commentators almost never doubted the morality of imperialism; that all the 
Pacific Islands would at some point come under control of ‘civilised’ nations was 
deemed a fait accompli. The types of anti-imperialism displayed by progressive 
groups in Britain had not yet trickled down to New Zealand where left-wing 
politics were in their infancy during this period. The ‘Clarionettes’, New 
Zealand’s first major influx of socialist immigrants, arrived at the turn of the 
century and soon helped set up the New Zealand Socialist Party, however even 
they had no noticeable impact on public debate surrounding Seddon’s Pacific 
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imperialism. Of course, every rule has its exceptions, and the trade-union 
politician John Rigg fulfilled this role by questioning New Zealand’s ability to 
govern Niueans and Cook Islanders, but even his criticism was not sustained to 
the extent of post-War Labour criticism.  
Racial stereotypes informed many commentators’ attitudes during these early 
debates. The high-profile death of New Zealand Anglican missionary, the Rev. 
John Patteson, on Nukapu in the Solomon Islands in 1871 still lingered in the 
minds of observers who equated the Pacific Islands with savagery, darkness, and 
cannibalism. Māori had proven difficult enough to ‘civilise’ within New Zealand, 
therefore many doubted whether it was a good idea for the State to expand its 
‘civilising mission’ even further. When faced with the prospect of extending New 
Zealand’s borders or developing the land within Aotearoa (only recently 
‘acquired’ in its own right) a large proportion of commentators believed the 
prudent course was to look after their own backyard first. New Zealand’s 
economic situation in the 1880s was far from promising, and so the wisdom of 
entering into expansive, not to mention expensive, imperial schemes was widely 
questioned.    
Even though economic prospects were rosier at the turn of the century under 
Seddon’s Liberal Government, criticism still carried a similar tone as in the 1880s. 
Importantly, Siegfried’s ‘Greater Imperialism’, the bonds between colony and 
Britain, were at their high point, meaning that New Zealand’s move to federate 
with Britain’s Crown Colony Fiji was judged an act of disloyalty. Race and 
racism were more noticeable at the turn of the century. Alongside existing racial 
arguments, was the development of a working-class consciousness that readily 
expressed its concern over the effect that cheap coloured labour could have on 
‘white’ jobs. ‘White Australasia’ was an ideal widely aspired to, and the thought 
of being ‘swamped’ in their own legislature by the people they described as 
‘niggers’, spooked politicians when federation with Fiji was touted. Criticism 
based on racial considerations was inspired by a combination of both fear and 
disdain. The annexation of the Cook Islands and Niue was criticised for its 
relative worthlessness; the people, according to Trimble in the House, were not 
worth governing.     
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Opposition to the possibility of New Zealand gaining control of Samoa at the 
end of the Great War was characterised by a mixture of the old-fashioned 
parochial criticism and a new strand of explicitly anti-imperial criticism. This new 
doctrinaire approach was brought by Holland’s Labour Party whose ‘no 
annexations’ policy was influenced by the anti-imperialism of Lenin and the 
wider international socialist movement. Public debate not only included 
arguments from fiscal conservatives who stressed the irresponsibility of taking on 
the ‘burden’ of governing more Pacific peoples, but the campaigning of a 
significant left-wing minority who launched a principled critique of Pacific 
expansion. These critiques were both anti-capitalist, in the sense that critics 
believed imperialism was the highest form of capitalism, and pro-Samoan, insofar 
as Labour believed the Samoans were perfectly capable of governing themselves. 
Holland’s ‘Samoan Complex’ remained a feature of Labour policy until his death 
in 1933, while others on the political Left held similar, if not more strident, views 
throughout the interwar period. 
This brings us to the second context explored in this thesis, which covers 
interwar criticism of New Zealand’s colonial record after it had taken 
responsibility for administering its Pacific territories, or, as the Fijian case 
demonstrated, became involved in its informal imperial sphere. Criticism in this 
period was still influenced by many of the same philosophies present in earlier 
critiques, but now had the added dimension of responding to actual colonial 
abuses. The second chapter of this thesis outlined the various responses to high-
profile colonial scandals in Samoa and Fiji. It argued that as well as left-wing 
critics there were also significant, if less numerous, Christian humanitarian voices 
that although not opposing imperialism per se, nonetheless objected to the 
perpetuation of colonial abuses. The protests of Liversedge and Greenwood 
reflect a Christian humanitarian response to colonial abuse (if not the typical 
Christian response). Their dissent stood out from what was a largely 
nonresponsive attitude towards colonial controversy by the denominational 
Churches. The pair were driven by a sense of compassion and righteousness that 
they accused their Churches of failing to uphold. 
Overshadowing Christian humanitarian criticism was the opposition of the 
political Left, many of whom were inspired by a sense of Christian compassion 
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similar to that of Liversedge and Greenwood. Many on the Left empathised with 
the plight of Pacific Islanders who found themselves under New Zealand’s 
colonial rule. It was not uncommon for this empathy to have been derived from 
prior experiences with te ao Māori. At times an interest in Māori affairs appears to 
have been somewhat of a prerequisite for a critical stance on Pacific colonialism. 
Soljak, for instance, was fluent in Te Reo and spent many years teaching in Māori 
communities. Finlayson, better known for his fictitious portrayals of modern 
Māori life than he was for his dissatisfaction over Pacific colonialism, spent a 
large period of his life living in a Māori household in Pukehina, Bay of Plenty, 
and claimed to be able to speak with the ‘the native mind’.2 Mason and Pat Potter 
were well known for their affinity with Māori as well as Pacific Islanders.3 And 
even Harry Holland, with his legendary ‘Samoan Complex’, found the time to be 
a student of Māori history and developed ties with the Kīngitanga. Leading critics 
viewed crooked colonialism in Samoa in the same vein as the injustices inflicted 
by Pākehā colonialists within Aotearoa. In this respect, New Zealand’s colonial 
critics conform to Howe’s claim that anticolonialists were committed to 
eradicating the ills of colonialism in their own nation first of all.
4
 
The intersection between critiques of colonialism within Aotearoa and in New 
Zealand’s Pacific Empire needs further exploration in its own right. Māori were 
typically viewed by Pākehā in a different light than New Zealand’s other 
colonised Polynesians. As is shown in chapter two, by the twentieth century 
Māori were included in the mainstream view of ‘White New Zealand’, while 
Samoans, despite their recognition as a ‘noble people’, were seen as a threat to the 
established order. Colonial critics, on the other hand, appeared to be less amiable 
to this point of view. Under instruction from the anti-imperial Comintern, the 
CPNZ were asked to continue their ‘struggle against Imperialism first by the 
exposure of the oppression and robbery of Somoa [sic] at the present time, and by 
the past and still continuing expropriation of the Maoris’.5 Chapter three 
illustrated how shared experiences of colonisation (as well as deeper genealogical 
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connections) encouraged Māori to sympathise with the Samoan and Cook Islands 
anticolonial struggles. 
At the same time, left-wing Pākehā could also arguably claim a natural empathy 
with Pacific Islanders due to their own experiences of subjugation in New 
Zealand. Although this point should not be overstated given the differences in 
experience, radical or progressive Pākehā were, to a degree, subject to similar 
treatment from the Government. They were marginalised from mainstream society 
on account of their politics. Like Island anticolonialists, socialists felt the brunt of 
the State censor. Holland was imprisoned for sedition in 1913 and regularly railed 
against the draconian official attitudes to freedom of expression. Finlayson was a 
victim of censorship as well; he commented how ‘the daily papers steadily refused 
all my fiercer statements concerning the suppression of the Mau in Samoa’, as 
well as his letters criticising British rule in Ireland ‘and the wrongs suffered by the 
Maori yesterday and today.’6 These New Zealanders, although fully-fledged 
citizens, were situated outside the norms of respectable society. They may not 
have been as marginal as late-Victorian vegetarians, homosexuals, spiritualists 
and so on, that Leela Gandhi has identified on account of their links to the 
colonised, but they were marginal all the same.
7
 Their criticism of New Zealand’s 
colonialism was an extension of their criticism of domestic politics.  
These same individuals were utterly discontent with New Zealand society. They 
embraced their marginality, and identified with the colonised more than the 
colonisers. Finlayson’s aim was ‘to warn the Pakeha, to show him, through Maori 
eyes, the danger of sacrificing completely the warm vivid life of the simple and 
the naïve to a system grown coldly and exclusively rational and greedy.’8 Mason 
regularly scorned the narrow-mindedness of his fellow citizens and their belief 
that ‘the world was made and the stars ranged in order to facilitate the transport of 
pigs between Taupiri and Wairoa’.9 In the Islands they saw an ideal, an escape, a 
saviour. Like the socialist utopianism that Gandhi surveys— ‘immature’, but 
powerful and essential as a stimulant for criticism just the same—Finlayson, 
Mason, and even Holland’s romanticism led them to believe that Pacific island 
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societies resembled their ideal socialist utopia more closely than the ‘civilised’ 
world they belonged to.
10
 The problem was that the very people who had ruined 
New Zealand society were doing their best to ruin their Pacific ideal.  
Romantic idealism could easily turn into paternalism. There was a fine line 
between speaking for the colonised, and standing up for them, and critics were 
always in danger of slipping towards the former. Derrick has argued that French 
socialist anticolonialists most regularly adopted paternalistic attitudes towards the 
colonies.
11
 Finlayson, to his credit, recognised this inclination within his own 
thinking. Looking back at his manifesto for Samoan self-Government,
12
 compiled 
as a young man in the early 1920s, he admitted it revealed his ‘tendency to 
didacticism’.13 Holland too was much maligned in Parliament for his long-winded 
moralising on behalf of the Samoans. His paternalism often came through in his 
depictions of Samoans as childish, ‘simple-minded’ and ‘primitive’.14 As Slipper 
concluded in 1934, despite the many friends the Samoans could call on, ‘the 
Samoans are more than able to speak for themselves, as they have proved time 
after time.’15  
This brings me to my final point. For all its emphasis on anti-imperialists, this 
thesis has not been an intellectual history of New Zealand anti-imperialism. The 
focus has been on the challenge to the colonial order at ‘home’. And in this, like 
other studies, my thesis has demonstrated that Empire came to affect the 
metropole in a myriad of ways. One of the main features that I have explored is 
the friendships or bonds formed between Pacific Islander and metropolitan critics 
which were forged through a shared revulsion towards imperialism. These ties, I 
suggest, were essential to both the anticolonial struggle and the undermining of 
the colonial order. Bernard Porter has pointed out that the Empire was ‘highly 
vulnerable’, and that brutality by the colonisers was ‘integral to [its] every day 
functioning’, and while colonists on the ground were aware of this reality, those 
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who resided in the metropole ‘were generally not’.16  The only time people back 
‘home’, in the metropole, caught a glimpse of colonial realities was when ‘some 
particular atrocity story leaked out’. The colonial critic’s role was to publicise the 
brutal realities of New Zealand’s Pacific colonialism that would have otherwise 
gone unheard. Even though the Government did their best to dismiss criticism, its 
presence was still undeniably effective. Without dissent, the colonial order would 
have remained uncontested, and brutality would have gone on unaccounted for. 
Moreover, the rule of colonial difference would have remained unchallenged. 
Although Pacific Islanders were perfectly capable of speaking for themselves and 
did so regularly, this thesis has shown that their voice was even more powerful 
when heard in conjunction with like-minded metropolitan citizens.  
This thesis has also shown that there were many more of these like-minded men 
and women in New Zealand’s metropolitan, even cosmopolitan, society than is 
often appreciated. Jonathan Schneer has written that because turn-of-the-century 
London ‘was an imperial metropolis it was cosmopolitan and because it was 
cosmopolitan it contained anti-imperialists and critics of empire.’ He went on to 
acknowledge that these people were not as influential as their imperial 
counterparts ‘but neither were they a negligible force.’ Finally, he reasoned ‘just 
as the champions of empire helped to shape the imperial metropolis, so too did 
they.’17 This study has argued that these same dynamics were in force in sub-
imperial, sub-metropolitan, sub-cosmopolitan New Zealand (albeit delayed until 
between the Wars). We can speak of this with a certain level of confidence 
because it was these marginalised views on imperialism and colonialism from the 
interwar period that became mainstream in the era of decolonisation; an era that 
began in ‘New Zealand’s Pacific’ with Samoa becoming the first Pacific nation to 
gain independence in 1962. Although this study has not been consciously shaped 
by a desire to trace the antecedents of decolonisation, it has nonetheless illustrated 
the rich tradition of colonial criticism within New Zealand that helped bring about 
this change in fortune.     
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